Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha. The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014. Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench. It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary. This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i] The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary. Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments. However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments. These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body
| Recommendatory Body | Suggested composition |
| 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) | Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| National Advisory Council (2005) | Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| NCRWC (2002) | Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person |
| Law Commission (1987) | Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic |
Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001; A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases. In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary. The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions
| Country | Method of Appointment to the highest court | Who is involved in making the appointments |
| UK | SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. | It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii] (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.) |
| Canada | Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] | A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v] |
| USA | Appointments are made by the President. | Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi] |
| Germany | Appointments are made by election. | Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii] |
| France | Appointments are made by the President. | President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii] |
Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.
[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)
[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.
[iii]. Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.
[iv]. Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).
[v]. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.
[vi]. Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.
[vii]. Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.
Minimum Support Price (MSP) is the assured price at which foodgrains are procured from farmers by the central and state governments and their agencies, for the central pool of foodgrains. The central pool is used for providing foodgrains under the Public Distribution System (PDS) and other welfare schemes, and also kept as reserve in the form of buffer stock. However, in the past few months, there have been demands to extend MSP to private trade as well and guarantee MSP to farmers on all kinds of trade. This blogpost looks at the state of public procurement of foodgrains in India and the provision of MSP.
Is MSP applicable for all crops?
The central government notifies MSP for 23 crops every year before the Kharif and Rabi seasons based on the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, an attached office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare. These crops include foodgrains such as cereals, coarse grains, and pulses. However, public procurement is largely limited to a few foodgrains such as paddy (rice), wheat, and, to a limited extent, pulses (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Percentage of crop production that was procured at MSP in 2019-20
Sources: Unstarred Question No. 331, Lok Sabha, September 15, 2020; PRS.
Since rice and wheat are the primary foodgrains distributed under PDS and stored for food security, their procurement level is considerably high. However, the National Food Security Act, 2013 requires the central and state governments to progressively undertake necessary reforms in PDS. One of the reforms requires them to diversify the commodities distributed under PDS over a period of time.
How does procurement vary across states?
The procurement of foodgrains is largely concentrated in a few states. Three states (Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Haryana) producing 46% of the wheat in the country account for 85% of its procurement (Figure 2). For rice, six states (Punjab, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Haryana) with 40% of the production have 74% share in procurement (Figure 3). The National Food Security Act, 2013 requires the central, state, and local governments to strive to progressively realise certain objectives for advancing food and nutritional security. One of these objectives involves geographical diversification of the procurement operations.
Figure 2: 85% wheat procurement is from three states (2019-20)
Sources: Department of Food and Public Distribution; PRS.
Figure 3: 76% of the rice procured comes from six states (2019-20)
Sources: Department of Food and Public Distribution; PRS.
Is MSP mandatory for private trade as well in some states?
MSP is not mandatory for purchase of foodgrains by private traders or companies. It acts as a reference price at which the government and its agencies procure certain foodgrains from farmers.
In September 2020, the central government enacted a new farm law which allows anyone with a PAN card to buy farmers’ produce in the ‘trade area’ outside the markets notified or run by the state Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees (APMCs). Buyers do not need to get a license from the state government or APMC, or pay any tax to them for such purchase in the ‘trade area’. These changes in regulations raised concerns regarding the kind of protections available to farmers in the ‘trade area’ outside APMC markets, particularly in terms of the price discovery and payment. In October 2020, Punjab passed a Bill in response to the central farm law to prohibit purchase of paddy and wheat below MSP. Any person or company compelling or pressurising farmers to sell below MSP will be punished with a minimum of three-year imprisonment and a fine. Note that 72% of the wheat and 92% of the rice produced in Punjab was purchased under public procurement in 2019-20.
Similarly, in November 2020, Rajasthan passed a Bill to declare those contract farming agreements as invalid where the purchase is done below MSP. Any person or company compelling or pressurising farmers to enter into such an invalid contract will be punished with 3 to 7 years of imprisonment, or a fine of minimum five lakh rupees, or both. Both these Bills have not been enacted yet as they are awaiting the Governors’ assent.
How has MSP affected the cropping pattern?
According to the central government’s procurement policy, the objective of public procurement is to ensure that farmers get remunerative prices for their produce and do not have to resort to distress sale. If farmers get a better price in comparison to MSP, they are free to sell their produce in the open market. The Economic Survey 2019-20 observed that the regular increase in MSP is seen by farmers as a signal to opt for crops which have an assured procurement system (for example, rice and wheat). The Economic Survey also noted that this indicates market prices do not offer remunerative options for farmers, and MSP has, in effect, become the maximum price that the farmers are able to realise.
Thus, MSP incentivises farmers to grow crops which are procured by the government. As wheat and rice are major food grains provided under the PDS, the focus of procurement is on these crops. This skews the production of crops in favour of wheat and paddy (particularly in states where procurement levels are high), and does not offer an incentive for farmers to produce other items such as pulses. Further, this puts pressure on the water table as these crops are water-intensive crops.
To encourage crop diversification and thereby reduce the consumption of water, some state governments are taking measures to incentivise farmers to shift away from paddy and wheat. For example, Haryana has launched a scheme in 2020 to provide Rs 7,000 per acre to those farmers who will use more than 50% of their paddy area (as per the area sown in 2019-20) for other crops. The farmers can grow maize, bajra, pulses, or cotton in such diversified area. Further, the crop produce grown in such diversified area under the scheme will be procured by the state government at MSP.
