Parliament sessions are usually held thrice a year: once in February for the Budget Session, once around July or August for the Monsoon Session, and once in November for the Winter Session. This year, the government is yet to announce the dates for the Winter Session. While there has been uncertainty around whether Parliament will meet, ministers in the government have indicated that the Session will be held soon.[1]
The practice of allowing the government to convene Parliament differs from those followed in other countries. Some of these countries have a limited role for the government in summoning the legislature, because in a parliamentary democracy the executive is accountable to Parliament. Allowing the government to call the Parliament to meet could be in conflict with this principle. While we wait for the government to announce the dates for the Winter Session, this post looks at the relationship between Parliament and the government, recommendations made over the years on improving some parliamentary customs, and discusses certain practices followed by other countries.
What is the role of Parliament in a democracy?
The Constitution provides for the legislature to make laws, the government to implement laws, and the courts to interpret and enforce these laws. While the judiciary is independent from the other two branches, the government is formed with the support of a majority of members in the legislature. Therefore, the government is collectively responsible to Parliament for its actions. This implies that Parliament (i.e. Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) can hold the government accountable for its decisions, and scrutinise its functioning. This may be done using various methods including, during debates on Bills or issues on the floor of Parliament, by posing questions to ministers during Question Hour, and in parliamentary committees.
Who convenes Parliament?
Parliament must be convened by the President at least once in every six months. Since the President acts on the advice of the central government, the duration of the session is decided by the government.
Given the legislature’s role in keeping the executive accountable for its actions, one argument is that the government should not have the power to convene Parliament. Instead, Parliament should convene itself, if a certain number of MPs agree, so that it can effectively exercise its oversight functions and address issues without delay. Some countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia release an annual calendar with the sitting dates at the beginning of the year.
How regularly has Parliament been meeting over the years?
Over the years, there has been a decline in the sitting days of Parliament. While Lok Sabha met for an average of 130 days in a year during the 1950s, these sittings came down to 70 days in the 2000s. Lesser number of sittings indicates that Parliament was able to transact less business compared to previous years. To address this, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution has recommended that Lok Sabha should have at least 120 sittings in a year, while Rajya Sabha should have 100 sittings.[2] 
The Constituent Assembly, while drafting the Constitution had debated the power that should be given to Parliament with regard to convening itself. Mr. K. T. Shah, a member of the Assembly, had suggested that in case the President or the Prime Minister are unable or unwilling to call for a Parliament session, the power to convene the Houses should be given to the presiding officers of those Houses (i.e., the Chairman of Rajya Sabha and the Speaker of Lok Sabha). In addition, he had also suggested that Parliament should itself regulate its procedure, sittings and timings.[3]
How does Parliament hold the government accountable?
One of the forums of holding the government accountable for its actions is the Question Hour. During Question Hour, MPs may pose questions to ministers related to the implementation of laws and policies by the government.
In the 16th Lok Sabha, question hour has functioned in Lok Sabha for 77% of the scheduled time, while in Rajya Sabha it has functioned for 47%. A lower rate of functioning reflects time lost due to disruptions which reduces the number of questions that may be answered orally. While Parliament may sit for extra hours to transact other business, time lost during Question Hour is not made up. Consequently, this time lost indicates a lost opportunity to hold the government accountable for its actions.
Further, there is no mechanism currently for answering questions which require inter-ministerial expertise or relate to broader government policy. Since the Prime Minister does not answer questions other than the ones pertaining to his ministries, such questions may either not get adequately addressed or remain unanswered. In countries such as the UK, the Prime Minister’s Question Time is conducted on a weekly basis. During the 30 minutes the Prime Minister answers questions posed by various MPs. These questions relate to broader government policies, engagements, and issues affecting the country.[4]
How is public opinion reflected in Parliament?
MPs may raise issues of public importance in Parliament, and examine the government’s response to problems being faced by citizens through: (i) a debate, which entails a reply by the concerned minister, or (ii) a motion which entails a vote. The time allocated for discussing some of these debates or Bills is determined by the Business Advisory Committee of the House, consisting of members from both the ruling and opposition parties.
Using these methods, MPs may discuss important matters, policies, and topical issues. The concerned minister while replying to the debate may make assurances to the House regarding steps that will be taken to address the situation. As of August 2017, 50% of the assurances made in the 16th Lok Sabha have been implemented.[5] 
Alternatively, MPs may move a motion for: (i) discussing important issues (such as inflation, drought, and corruption), (ii) adjournment of business in a House in order to express displeasure over a government policy, or (iii) expressing no confidence in the government leading to its resignation. The 16thLok Sabha has only discussed one adjournment motion so far.
To improve government accountability in Parliament, the opposition in some countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia forms a shadow cabinet.[6],[7] Under such a system, opposition MPs track a certain portfolio, scrutinise its performance and suggest alternate programs. This allows for detailed tracking and scrutiny of ministries, and assists MPs in making constructive suggestions. Some of these countries also provide for days when the opposition parties decide the agenda for Parliament.
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[1] Sonia Gandhi accuses of Modi govt ‘sabotaging’ Parliament Winter session, Arun Jaitley rejects charge’, The Indian Express, November 20, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/jaitley-refutes-sonia-gandhis-charge-of-sabotaging-parliament-session-says-congress-too-had-delayed-sitting-4946482/; ‘Congress also rescheduled Parliament sessions: Arun Jaitley hits back at Sonia Gandhi’, The Times of India, November 20, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/congress-also-rescheduled-parliament-sessions-arun-jaitley-hits-back-at-sonia-gandhi/articleshow/61726787.cms.
[2] Parliament and State Legislatures, Chapter 5, National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, March 31, 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch5.htm.
[3] Constituent Assembly Debates, May 18, 1949.
[4] Prime Minister’s Question Time, Parliament of the United Kingdom, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/business/questions/.
[5] Lok Sabha and Session Wise Report of Assurances in Lok Sabha, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, http://www.mpa.gov.in/mpa/print_summary_lses_ls.aspx.
[6] Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, Parliament of the United Kingdom, http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/government-and-opposition1/opposition-holding/.
[7] Current Shadow Ministry List, Parliament of Australia, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Parliam
Recently, the Supreme Court collegium reiterated its recommendations for the appointment of 11 judges to certain High Courts. It had first recommended these names earlier this year and in August last year, but these appointments were not made. The Indian judiciary faces high vacancies across all levels (the Supreme Court, High Courts, and subordinate courts). Vacancy of judges in courts is one of the reasons for delays and a rising number of pending cases, as there are not enough judges to hear and decide cases. As of today, more than four crore cases are pending across all courts in India. In this blog post, we discuss vacancies across courts over the years, delays in appointment of judges, and methods to determine the adequate judge strength required to handle the caseload courts face.
High vacancy of judges across courts
Vacancies in courts keep on arising periodically due to retirement, resignation, demise, or elevation of judges. Over the years, the sanctioned strength of judges in both High Courts and subordinate courts has been increased gradually. However, vacancies persist due to insufficient appointments (see Figures 1 and 2). Between 2010 and 2020, vacancies increased from 18% to 21% across all levels of courts (from 6% to 12% in the Supreme Court, from 33% to 38% in High Courts, and from 18% to 20% in subordinate courts).
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Figure 1: Vacancy of judges in High Courts |
Figure 2: Vacancy of judges in subordinate courts |
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Sources: Court News 2010-2018; Vacancy Statement, and Rajya Sabha replies, Part I, Budget Session (2021), Department of Justice; PRS. |
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As on November 1, 2021, the Supreme Court had a vacancy of one judge (out of a sanctioned strength of 34). Vacancy in High Courts stood at 37% (406 posts vacant out of a sanctioned strength of 1,098). Since May, 2021, the Supreme Court collegium has recommended more than 130 names for appointment as High Court judges. In three High Courts (Telangana, Patna, and Calcutta), at least half of the posts are vacant (see Figure 3). The Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2020) noted that every year, 35-40% of posts of High Court judges remain unfilled.
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Figure 3: Vacancy of judges across High Courts (in %) (as on November 1, 2021)
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Source: Vacancy Statement, Department of Justice; PRS. |
Appointments of High Court judges are guided by a memorandum of procedure. As per this memorandum, the appointment process is to be initiated by the concerned High Court at least six months before a vacancy occurs. However, the Standing Committee (2021) noted that this timeline is rarely adhered to by High Courts. Further, in the final stage of the process, after receiving recommendations from the Supreme Court collegium, the executive appoints judges to the High Court. No timeline is prescribed for this stage of the appointment process. In 2018 and 2019, the average time taken to appoint High Court judges after receiving the collegium’s recommendations was five to seven months.
As of today, over 3.6 crore cases are pending before subordinate courts in India. As on February 20, 2020, 21% posts for judges were vacant (5,146 posts out of the sanctioned strength of 24,018) in subordinate courts. Subordinate courts in Bihar, Haryana, and Jharkhand (among the states with high population) had a high proportion of vacancies of judges (see Figure 4). Note that the Supreme Court is monitoring the procedure for appointment of judges to subordinate courts.
For an analysis of the data on pendency and vacancies in the Indian judiciary, see here.
Figure 4: Vacancy of judges across subordinate courts (in %) (as on February 20, 2020)
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Source: Report No. 101, Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2020); PRS. |
How many judges do we need?
The Law Commission of India (1987) had noted the importance of manpower planning for the judiciary. Lack of adequate number of judges means a greater workload per judge. Thus, it becomes essential to arrive at an optimal judge strength to deal with pending and new cases in courts. Over the years, different methods of calculating the required judge strength for subordinate courts (where the backlog of cases in the Indian judiciary is concentrated) have been recommended (see Table 1).
Table 1: Methods recommended for calculating the required number of judges for subordinate courts
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Method of calculation |
Recommendation and its status |
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Judge-to-population ratio: optimum number of judges per million population |
The Law Commission of India (1987) had recommended increasing this ratio to 50 judges per million people. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court (2001) and the Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2002). For 2020, the judge-to-population ratio was 21 judges per million population. Note that this figure is calculated based on the sanctioned strength of judges in the Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate courts. |
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Rate of disposal: number of additional judges required (to clear the existing backlog of cases and ensure that new backlog is not created) based on the average number of cases disposed per judge |
The Law Commission of India (2014) proposed this method. It rejected the judge-to-population ratio method, observing that filing of cases per capita varies substantially across geographic units depending on socio-economic conditions. |
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Weighted case load method: calculating judge strength based on the disposal by judges, taking into account the nature and complexity of cases in local conditions |
The National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMS) (2016) critiqued the rate of disposal method. It proposed, as an interim measure, the weighted case load method, which addresses the existing backlog of cases as well as the new flow of cases every year in subordinate courts. In 2017, the Supreme Court accepted this model. |
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Time-based weighted case load method: calculating the required judge strength taking into account the actual time spent by judges in different types of cases at varying stages based on an empirical study |
Used widely in the United States, this was the long-term method recommended by the NCMS (2016) to assess the required judge strength for subordinate courts. It involves determining the total number of ‘judicial hours’ required for disposing of the case load of each court. The Delhi High Court used this approach in a pilot project (January 2017- December 2018) to calculate the ideal judge strength for disposing of pending cases in certain courts in Delhi. |
Sources: Reports No. 120 (1987) and 245 (2014), Law Commission of India; Report No. 85, Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2002); Note for Calculating Required Judge Strength for Subordinate Courts, National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMS) (2016); Imtiyaz Ahmad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Supreme Court (2017); PRS.
