According to news reports, the Supreme Court stayed a Calcutta High Court judgement on the Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, 2011 [Singur Act] on August 24, 2012. The apex court also issued a notice to Tata Motors seeking its response within four weeks, on the West Bengal government's petition challenging the High Court order. In 2008, the Left Front government acquired land in Singur under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for Tata Motors to build a Nano car factory.  In its first year of coming to power in West Bengal, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) led government notified the Singur Act through which it sought to reclaim this land to return a portion of it to farmers. On June 22, 2012, a Division bench of the Calcutta High Court struck down the Singur Act terming it unconstitutional and void.  In its judgment, the Court found some sections of the Singur Act to be in conflict with the central Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  As land acquisition is a Concurrent List subject under the Constitution, both Parliament and state legislatures have the power to make laws on it.  However, if provisions in the state law conflict with provisions in the central law, then the state law cannot prevail unless it receives Presidential assent.  The Calcutta High Court held the Singur Act to be unconstitutional because: (a) it was in conflict with the central Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and (b) Presidential assent was not obtained for the Act to prevail in West Bengal. The central Act mentions that for the government to acquire land, it has to demonstrate: (1) that land is being acquired for a public purpose,[i] and (2) that the government will provide compensation to persons from whom land is being acquired.  Provisions in the Singur Act that relate to public purpose and compensation were found to be in conflict with the corresponding provisions in the central Act.  The Court was of the opinion that transfer of land to the farmers does not constitute ‘public purpose’ as defined in the central Act.  As argued by the Tata Motors’ counsel, return of land to unwilling owners is a ‘private purpose’ or in ‘particular interest of individuals’ rather than in the ‘general interest of the community’.  Second, clauses pertaining to compensation to Tata Motors for their investment in the Nano project were found to be vague.  The Singur Act only provides for the refund of the amount paid by Tata Motors and the vendors to the state government for leasing the land.  It does not provide for the payment of any other amount of money for acquiring the Tata Motors’ land nor the principles for the determination of such an amount.  The High Court ordered that these provisions tantamount to ‘no compensation’ and struck down the related provisions. The matter will come up for consideration in the Supreme Court next on October 15, 2012.


[i] According to Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, acquisition of land for ‘public purpose’ includes, among others: provision or planned development of village sites; provision of land for town or rural planning; the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of a scheme or policy of the Government; and the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State.

India is one of the fastest growing aviation markets in the world.  Its domestic traffic makes up 69% of the total airline traffic in South Asia.  India’s airport capacity is expected to handle 1 billion trips annually by 2023. The Ministry of Civil Aviation is responsible for formulating national aviation policies and programmes.  Today, Lok Sabha will discuss and vote upon the budget of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In light of this, we discuss key issues with the aviation sector in India. 

The aviation sector came under severe financial stress during the Covid-19 pandemic. After air travel was suspended in March 2020, airline operators in India reported losses worth more than Rs 19,500 crore while airports reported losses worth more than Rs 5,120 crore. However, several airline companies were under financial stress before the pandemic affected passenger travel. For instance, in the past 15 years, seventeen airlines have exited the market.  Out of those, two airlines, Air Odisha Aviation Pvt Ltd and Deccan Charters Pvt Ltd exited the market in 2020.  Air India has been reporting consistent losses over the past four years. All other major private airlines in India such as Indigo and Spice Jet faced losses in 2018-19.  

Figure 1: Operating profit/loss of major airlines in India (in Rs crore)

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Note: Vistara Airlines commenced operations in 2015, while Air Asia began in 2014; Negative values indicate operating loss.
Source: Unstarred Question 1812 answered on August 4, 2021, and Unstarred Question 1127 answered on September 21, 2020; Rajya Sabha; PRS.

Sale of Air India

Air India has accounted for the biggest expenditure head of the Ministry of Civil Aviation since 2011-12.  Between 2009-10 and 2020-21, the government spent Rs 1,22,542 crore on Air India through budgeted allocations.  In October 2021, the sale of Air India to Talace Ltd., which is a subsidiary of Tata Sons Pvt Ltd, was approved.  The bid for Air India was finalised at Rs 18,000 crore.  

Up to January 2020, Air India had accumulated debt worth Rs 60,000 crore.  The central government is repaying this debt in the financial year 2021-22.  After the finalisation of the sale, the government allocated roughly Rs 71,000 crore for expenses related to Air India. 

In addition to loan repayment, in 2021-22, the government will provide Air India with a fresh loan (Rs 4,500 crore) and grants (Rs 1,944 crore) to recover from the shock of Covid-19.  To pay for the medical benefits of retired employees of Air India, a recurring expense of Rs 165 crore will be borne by the central government each year.   

In 2022-23, Rs 9,260 crore is allocated towards servicing the debt of AIAHL (see Table 1). AIAHL is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) formed by the government to hold the assets and liabilities of Air India while the process of its sale takes place. 

Table 1: Breakdown of expenditure on Air India (in Rs crore)

Major Head

2020-21 Actual

2021-22 RE

2022-23 BE

% change from 2021-22 RE to 2022-23 BE

Equity infusion in AIAHL

-

62,057

-

-100%

Debt servicing of AIAHL

2,184

2,217

9,260

318%

Medical benefit to retired employees

-

165

165

0%

Loans to AI

-

4,500

-

-100%

Grants for cash losses during Covid-19

-

1,944

-

-100%

Total

2,184

70,883

9,425

-87%

           

Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI: Airports Authority of India; AIAHL – Air India Asset Holding Limited; AI – Air India. Percentage change is from RE 2021-22 to BE 2022-23. 
Source: Demands for Grants 2022-23, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.

Privatisation of Airports

Airports Authority of India (AAI) is responsible for creating, upgrading, maintaining and managing civil aviation infrastructure in the country.   As on June 23, 2020, it operates and manages 137 airports in the country.   Domestic air traffic has more than doubled from around 61 million passengers in 2013-14 to around 137 million in 2019-20.  International passenger traffic has grown from 47 million in 2013-14 to around 67 million in 2019-20, registering a growth of over 6% per annum.  As a result, airports in India are witnessing rising levels of congestion.  Most major airports are operating at 85% to 120% of their handling capacity.   In response to this, the government has decided to privatise some airports to address the problem of congestion.  

AAI has leased out eight of its airports through Public Private Partnership (PPP) for operation, management and development on long term lease basis.  Six of these airports namely, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Guwahati, Thiruvananthapuram, and Mangaluru have been leased out to M/s Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL) for 50 years (under PPP).  The ownership of these airports remains with AAI and the operations will be back with AAI after the concession period is over.  The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted that the government expects to have 24 PPP airports by 2024.  

Figure 2: Allocation towards AAI (in Rs crore)

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Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI – Airports Authority of India; IEBR – Internal and Extra-Budgetary Resources;
Source: Demand for Grant documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS. 

The Committee also noted a structural issue in the way airport concessions are given.  As of now, entities that bid the highest amount are given the rights to operate an airport.  This leads them to pass on the high charge to airline operators.  This system does not consider the actual cost of the services and leads to an arbitrary increase in the cost of airline operators.  The Ministry sees the role of AAI in future policy issues to include providing high quality, safe and customer-oriented airport and air navigation services.  In 2022-23, the government has allocated Rs 150 crore to AAI, which is almost ten times higher than the budget estimates of 2021-22. 

Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS-UDAN)

The top 15 airports in the country account for about 83% of the total passenger traffic.  These airports are also close to their saturation limit, and hence the Ministry notes that there is a need to add more Tier-II and Tier-III cities to the aviation network.  The Regional Connectivity Scheme was introduced in 2016 to stimulate regional air connectivity and make air travel affordable to the masses.  The budget for this scheme is Rs 4,500 crore over five years from 2016-17 to 2021-22.   As of December 16, 2021, 46% of this amount has been released.  In 2022-23, the scheme has been allocated Rs 601 crore, which is 60% lower than the revised estimates of 2021-22 (Rs 994 crore).  

Under the scheme, airline operators are incentivised to operate on under-served routes by providing them with viability gap funding and airport fee waivers.  AAI, which is the implementing agency of this scheme, has sanctioned 948 routes to boost regional connectivity.  As of January 31, 2022, 43% of these routes have been operationalised.  As per the Ministry, lack of availability of land and creation of regional infrastructure has led to delays in the scheme.  Issues with obtaining licenses and unsustainable operation of awarded routes also contribute to the delay.  As per the Ministry, these issues, along with the setback faced due to the pandemic acted as major obstacles for the effective utilisation of funds.

Figure 3: Expenditure on Regional Connectivity Scheme (in Rs crore)

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 Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; 
 Source: Demand for Grants documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.

Potential of air cargo 

The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted India’s cargo industry’s huge potential with respect to its geographical location, its growing economy, and its growth in domestic and international trade in the last decade.  In 2019-20, all Indian airports together handled 3.33 million metric tonnes (MMT) of freight.  This is much lower than the cargo handled by Hong Kong (4.5 MMT), Memphis (4.8 MMT), and Shanghai (3.7 MMT), which are the top three airports in terms of the volume of freight handled.  The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has noted inadequate infrastructure as a major bottleneck in developing the country’s air cargo sector.  To reduce such bottleneck, it recommended the Ministry to establish dedicated cargo airports, and automate air cargo procedures and information systems to streamline redundant processes.   

The Committee has also highlighted that the Open Sky Policy enables foreign cargo carriers to freely operate cargo services to and from any airports in India having customs/immigration facilities.  They account for 90-95% of the total international cargo carried to and from the country.  On the other hand, Indian air cargo operators face discriminatory practices and regulatory impediments for operating international cargo flights in foreign countries.  The Committee urged the Ministry to provide a level-playing field for Indian air cargo operators and to ensure equal opportunities for them.  The Ministry revised the Open Sky Policy in December 2020.   Under the revised policy, the operations of foreign ad hoc and pure non-scheduled freighter charter service flights have been restricted to six airports - Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, and Mumbai. 

Rising cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel

The cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) forms around 40% of the total operating cost of airlines and impacts their financial viability.  ATF prices have been consistently rising over the past years, placing stress on the balance sheets of airline companies.  As per recent news reports, airfares are expected to rise as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is making ATF costlier.

ATF attracts VAT which is variable across states and does not have a provision for input tax credit.  High rates of aviation fuel coupled with high VAT rates are adversely affecting airline companies.

Table 2: Expenditure on ATF by airlines over the years (in Rs crore)

Year

National Carriers

Private Domestic Airlines

2016-17

         7,286 

       10,506 

2017-18

         8,563 

       13,596 

2018-19

       11,788 

       20,662 

2019-20

       11,103 

       23,354 

2020-21

         3,047 

         7,452 

Source: Unstarred Question 2581, Rajya Sabha; PRS. 

The Ministry, in January 2020,  has reduced the tax burden on ATF by eliminating fuel throughput charges that were levied by airport operators at all airports across India.  Central excise on ATF was reduced from 14% to 11% w.e.f. October 11, 2018.  State governments have also reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF drawn on RCS airports to 1% or less for 10 years.  For non-RCS-UDAN operations, various state governments have reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF to within 5%.  The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has recommended ATF to be included within the ambit of GST and that applicable GST should not exceed 12% on ATF with full Input Tax Credit. 

For more details, please refer to the Demand for Grants Analysis of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2022-23.