On Monday, December 4, the Chairman of Rajya Sabha disqualified two Members of Parliament (MPs) from the House under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (better known as the anti-defection law) for having defected from their party.[1] These members were elected on a Janata Dal (United) ticket. The Madras High Court is also hearing petitions filed by 18 MLAs who were disqualified by the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly in September 2017 under the anti-defection law. Allegations of legislators defecting in violation of the law have been made in several other states including Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Nagaland, Telangana and Uttarakhand in recent years.[2] In this context, we explain the anti-defection law.
What is the anti-defection law?
Aaya Ram Gaya Ram was a phrase that became popular in Indian politics after a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed his party thrice within the same day in 1967. The anti-defection law sought to prevent such political defections which may be due to reward of office or other similar considerations.[3]
The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution in 1985. It lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on grounds of defection by the Presiding Officer of a legislature based on a petition by any other member of the House. A legislator is deemed to have defected if he either voluntarily gives up the membership of his party or disobeys the directives of the party leadership on a vote. This implies that a legislator defying (abstaining or voting against) the party whip on any issue can lose his membership of the House. The law applies to both Parliament and state assemblies.
Are there any exceptions under the law?
Yes, legislators may change their party without the risk of disqualification in certain circumstances. The law allows a party to merge with or into another party provided that at least two-thirds of its legislators are in favour of the merger. In such a scenario, neither the members who decide to merge, nor the ones who stay with the original party will face disqualification.
Various expert committees have recommended that rather than the Presiding Officer, the decision to disqualify a member should be made by the President (in case of MPs) or the Governor (in case of MLAs) on the advice of the Election Commission.[4] This would be similar to the process followed for disqualification in case the person holds an office of profit (i.e. the person holds an office under the central or state government which carries a remuneration, and has not been excluded in a list made by the legislature).
How has the law been interpreted by the Courts while deciding on related matters?
The Supreme Court has interpreted different provisions of the law. We discuss some of these below.
The phrase ‘Voluntarily gives up his membership’ has a wider connotation than resignation
The law provides for a member to be disqualified if he ‘voluntarily gives up his membership’. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted that in the absence of a formal resignation by the member, the giving up of membership can be inferred by his conduct.[5] In other judgments, members who have publicly expressed opposition to their party or support for another party were deemed to have resigned.[6]
In the case of the two JD(U) MPs who were disqualified from Rajya Sabha on Monday, they were deemed to have ‘voluntarily given up their membership’ by engaging in anti-party activities which included criticizing the party on public forums on multiple occasions, and attending rallies organised by opposition parties in Bihar.[7]
Decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review
The law initially stated that the decision of the Presiding Officer is not subject to judicial review. This condition was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1992, thereby allowing appeals against the Presiding Officer’s decision in the High Court and Supreme Court.[8] However, it held that there may not be any judicial intervention until the Presiding Officer gives his order.
In 2015, the Hyderabad High Court, refused to intervene after hearing a petition which alleged that there had been delay by the Telangana Assembly Speaker in acting against a member under the anti-defection law.[9]
Is there a time limit within which the Presiding Officer has to decide?
The law does not specify a time-period for the Presiding Officer to decide on a disqualification plea. Given that courts can intervene only after the Presiding Officer has decided on the matter, the petitioner seeking disqualification has no option but to wait for this decision to be made.
There have been several cases where the Courts have expressed concern about the unnecessary delay in deciding such petitions.[10] In some cases this delay in decision making has resulted in members, who have defected from their parties, continuing to be members of the House. There have also been instances where opposition members have been appointed ministers in the government while still retaining the membership of their original parties in the legislature.[11]
In recent years, opposition MLAs in some states, such as Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, have broken away in small groups gradually to join the ruling party. In some of these cases, more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party.
In these scenarios, the MLAs were subject to disqualification while defecting to the ruling party in smaller groups. However, it is not clear if they will still face disqualification if the Presiding Officer makes a decision after more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party. The Telangana Speaker in March 2016 allowed the merger of the TDP Legislature Party in Telangana with the ruling TRS, citing that in total, 80% of the TDP MLAs (12 out of 15) had joined the TRS at the time of taking the decision.[12]
In Andhra Pradesh, legislators of the main opposition party recently boycotted the entire 12-day assembly session. This boycott was in protest against the delay of over 18 months in action being taken against legislators of their party who have allegedly defected to the ruling party.[13] The Vice President, in his recent order disqualifying two JD(U) members stated that all such petitions should be decided by the Presiding Officers within a period of around three months.
Does the anti-defection law affect the ability of legislators to make decisions?
The anti-defection law seeks to provide a stable government by ensuring the legislators do not switch sides. However, this law also restricts a legislator from voting in line with his conscience, judgement and interests of his electorate. Such a situation impedes the oversight function of the legislature over the government, by ensuring that members vote based on the decisions taken by the party leadership, and not what their constituents would like them to vote for.
Political parties issue a direction to MPs on how to vote on most issues, irrespective of the nature of the issue. Several experts have suggested that the law should be valid only for those votes that determine the stability of the government (passage of the annual budget or no-confidence motions).[14]
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[1] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066 and http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57067.
[2] MLA Defection Politics Not New, Firstpost, March 13, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-forms-govt-in-goa-manipur-mla-defection-politics-not-new-telangana-ap-perfected-it-3331872.html.
[3] The Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend52.htm.
[4] Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdfand the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm.
[5] Ravi Naik vs Union of India, 1994, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/554446/.
[6] G.Viswanathan Vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras& Another, 1996, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093980/ and Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, 2007, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620629/ and Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[7] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[8] Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachilhu and Others, 1992, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1686885/.
[9] Sabotage of Anti-Defection Law in Telangana, 2015, https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/50/commentary/sabotage-anti-defection-law-telangana.html.
[10] Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha Vs Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors., 2012, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45034065/ and Mayawati Vs Markandeya Chand & Ors., 1998, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1801522/.
[11] Anti-Defecton Law Ignored, November 30, 2017, http://www.news18.com/news/politics/anti-defection-law-ignored-as-mlas-defect-to-tdp-trs-in-andhra-pradesh-and-telangana-1591319.htmland It’s official Minister Talasani is still a TDP Member, March 27, 2015, http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/Telangana/2015-03-27/Its-Official-Minister-Talasani-is-still-a-TDP-member/140135.
[12] Telangana Legislative Assembly Bulletin, March 10, 2016, http://www.telanganalegislature.org.in/documents/10656/19317/Assembly+Buletin.PDF/a0d4bb52-9acf-494f-80e7-3a16e3480460; 12 TDP MLAs merged with TRS, March 11, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/12-tdp-mlas-merged-with-trs/article8341018.ece.
[13] The line TD leaders dare not cross, December 4, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/the-line-td-leaders-dare-not-cross/article21257521.ece
[14] Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution, 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm, Report of the Committee on electoral reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdf and Law Commission (170th report), 1999, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm.
The Finance Minister, Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman, presented the Union Budget for the financial year 2019-20 in Parliament on July 5, 2019. In the 2019-20 budget, the government presented the estimates of its expenditure and receipts for the year 2019-20. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government raised or spent in 2017-18. In addition, the budget also presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2018-19 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget.
What are revised estimates?
Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.
For instance, estimates for the year 2018-19 were presented as part of the 2018-19 budget in February 2018. In the 2019-20 interim budget presented in February 2019 (10 months after the financial year 2018-19 got underway), the government revised these estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and incorporated estimates for the remaining two months.
The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. In addition to the monthly accounts, the CGA also publishes the provisional unaudited figures for the financial year by the end of the month of May. Once these provisional figures are audited by the CAG, they are presented as actuals in next year’s budget. The CGA reported the figures for 2018-19 on May 31, 2019.[1] The Economic Survey 2018-19 presented on July 4, 2019 uses these figures.[2]
The budget presented on July 5 replicates the revised estimates reported as part of the interim budget (February 1, 2019). Thus, it did not take into account the updated figures for the year 2018-19 from the CGA.
Table 1 gives a comparison of the 2018-19 revised estimates presented by the central government in the budget with the provisional unaudited figures maintained by the CGA for the year 2018-19.[3]
Table 1: Budget at a Glance: Comparison of 2018-19 revised estimates with CGA figures (unaudited) (Rs crore)
|
Actuals |
Budgeted |
Revised |
Provisional |
Difference |
|
|
Revenue Expenditure |
18,78,833 |
21,41,772 |
21,40,612 |
20,08,463 |
-1,32,149 |
|
Capital Expenditure |
2,63,140 |
3,00,441 |
3,16,623 |
3,02,959 |
-13,664 |
|
Total Expenditure |
21,41,973 |
24,42,213 |
24,57,235 |
23,11,422 |
-1,45,813 |
|
Revenue Receipts |
14,35,233 |
17,25,738 |
17,29,682 |
15,63,170 |
-1,66,512 |
|
Capital Receipts |
1,15,678 |
92,199 |
93,155 |
1,02,885 |
9,730 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Recoveries of Loans |
15,633 |
12,199 |
13,155 |
17,840 |
4,685 |
|
Other receipts (including disinvestments) |
1,00,045 |
80,000 |
80,000 |
85,045 |
5,045 |
|
Total Receipts (without borrowings) |
15,50,911 |
18,17,937 |
18,22,837 |
16,66,055 |
-1,56,782 |
|
Revenue Deficit |
4,43,600 |
4,16,034 |
4,10,930 |
4,45,293 |
34,363 |
|
% of GDP |
2.6 |
2.2 |
2.2 |
2.4 |
|
|
Fiscal Deficit |
5,91,062 |
6,24,276 |
6,34,398 |
6,45,367 |
10,969 |
|
% of GDP |
3.5 |
3.3 |
3.4 |
3.4 |
|
|
Primary Deficit |
62,110 |
48,481 |
46,828 |
62,692 |
15,864 |
|
% of GDP |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
0.3 |
|
Sources: Budget at a Glance, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
The 2018-19 provisional figures for revenue receipts is Rs 15,63,170 crore, which is Rs 1,66,512 crore less than the revised estimates. This is largely due to Rs 1,67,455 crore shortfall in centre’s net tax revenue between the revised estimates and the provisional estimates (Table 2).
Major taxes which see a shortfall between the gross tax revenue presented in the revised estimates vis-à-vis the provisional figures are income tax (Rs 67,346 crore) and GST (Rs 59,930 crore). Non-tax revenue and disinvestment receipts as per the provisional figures are higher than the revised estimates.
Table 2: Break up of central government receipts: Comparison of 2018-19 RE with CGA figures (unaudited) (Rs crore)
|
|
Actuals |
Budgeted |
Revised |
Provisional |
Difference |
|
Gross Tax Revenue |
19,19,009 |
22,71,242 |
22,48,175 |
20,80,203 |
-1,67,972 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporation Tax |
5,71,202 |
6,21,000 |
6,71,000 |
6,63,572 |
-7,428 |
|
Taxes on Income |
4,30,772 |
5,29,000 |
5,29,000 |
4,61,654 |
-67,346 |
|
Goods and Services Tax |
4,42,562 |
7,43,900 |
6,43,900 |
5,83,970 |
-59,930 |
|
Customs |
1,29,030 |
1,12,500 |
1,30,038 |
1,17,930 |
-12,108 |
|
Union Excise Duties |
2,59,431 |
2,59,600 |
2,59,612 |
2,30,998 |
-28,614 |
|
A. Centre's Net Tax Revenue |
12,42,488 |
14,80,649 |
14,84,406 |
13,16,951 |
-1,67,455 |
|
B. Non Tax Revenue |
1,92,745 |
2,45,089 |
2,45,276 |
2,46,219 |
943 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest Receipts |
13,574 |
15,162 |
12,047 |
12,815 |
768 |
|
Dividend and Profits |
91,361 |
1,07,312 |
1,19,264 |
1,13,424 |
-5,840 |
|
Other Non-Tax Revenue |
87,810 |
1,22,615 |
1,13,965 |
1,19,980 |
6,015 |
|
C. Capital Receipts (without borrowings) |
1,15,678 |
92,199 |
93,155 |
1,02,885 |
9,730 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disinvestment |
1,00,045 |
80,000 |
80,000 |
85,045 |
5,045 |
|
Receipts (without borrowings) (A+B+C) |
15,50,911 |
18,17,937 |
18,22,837 |
16,66,055 |
-1,56,782 |
|
Borrowings |
5,91,062 |
6,24,276 |
6,34,398 |
6,45,367 |
10,969 |
|
Total Receipts (including borrowings) |
21,41,973 |
24,42,213 |
24,57,235 |
23,11,422 |
-1,45,813 |
Note: Centre’s net tax revenue is gross tax revenue less share of states in central taxes. Figures for GST include receipts from the GST compensation cess. Note that GST was levied for a nine-month period during the year 2017-18, starting July 2017.
Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
While the provisional figures show a considerable decrease in receipts (Rs 1,56,782 crore) as compared to the revised estimates, fiscal deficit has not shown a comparable increase. Fiscal deficit is estimated to be Rs 10,969 crore higher than the revised estimates as per the provisional accounts.
On the expenditure side, the total expenditure as per the provisional figures show a decrease of Rs 1,45,813 crore as compared to the revised estimates. Certain Ministries and expenditure items have seen a decrease in expenditure as compared to the revised estimates made by the government. As per the provisional accounts, the expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution are Rs 22,133 crore and Rs 70,712 crore lower than the revised estimates, respectively. The decrease in the Ministries’ expenditure as a percentage of the revised estimates are 29% and 39%, respectively. The food subsidy according to CGA was Rs 1,01,904 crore, which was Rs 69,394 crore lower than the revised estimates for the year 2018-19 given in the budget documents.
[1] “Accounts of the Union Government of India (Provisional/Unaudited) for the Financial Year 2018-19”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Finance, May 31, 2019.
[2] Fiscal Developments, Economic Survey 2018-19, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/vol2chapter/echap02_vol2.pdf.
[3] Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, March 2018-19, http://www.cga.nic.in/MonthlyReport/Published/3/2018-2019.aspx.
