The Department of Land Resources in the Ministry of Rural Development has released a draft version of The Land Titling Bill, 2011 on its website. This draft is a major revision of the original draft Bill released in 2010. Public comments on this draft are invited before June 24, 2011. A copy of the draft can be found here. The Bill provides for the registration of all immovable property to establish a system of conclusive, electronically recorded titles. It also provides for a mechanism to invite objections and for the resolution of disputes through special tribunals. The property record will be considered as conclusive ownership by the person mentioned. This will help resolve uncertainties in property transactions. Given that land is a state subject, the Bill is meant to be a model law for adoption by the states individually.  The framework of the bill is explained below. I. Land Titling Authority and Preparation of Records The Bill establishes a Land Titling Authority at the State level. The Authority’s task is to prepare a record of all immovable properties in its jurisdiction. These records will contain (a) survey data of boundaries of each property; (b) a unique identification number for each property, which may be linked to a UID number; (c) any record created by an officer of the state or UT government authorised by the laws of that state to make such records; and (d) a record of Title over each property. II. Title Registration Officer and Registration Process The Bill provides for the government to create Title Registration Offices at various places, and for a Title Registration Officer (TRO) to function under the supervision of the Land Titling Authority.  The TRO will have powers of a civil court and is charged with the task of creating e a Register of Titles. Steps for the registering of titles include: (a) notification of available land records data by the TRO, (b) invitation to persons with interest in such properties to make objections to the data, and (c) registration of properties by the TRO for which no dispute is brought to his notice in writing. In the case the absoluteness of the title to a property is disputed, the TRO will make an entry into the Register of Titles to that effect and refer the case to the District Land Titling Tribunal (discussed below) III. District Land Titling Tribunal and State Land Titling Appellate Tribunal The Bill proposes to set up a District Land Titling Tribunal, consisting of one or more serving officers not below the rank of Joint Collector / Sub Divisional Magistrate of the District. The government may also establish one or more State Land Titling Appellate Tribunals, to be presided over by serving Judicial Officers in the rank of District Judge. Revisions to the orders of the State Land Titling Appellate Tribunal may be made by a Special Bench of the High Court. The Bill bars civil courts from having jurisdiction to entertain proceedings in respect to matters that the TRO, District Land Titling Tribunal, and State Land Titling Appellate Tribunal are empowered to determine. IV. Completion of Records and Notification When preparation of the Record for whole or part of a specific are is complete, it will be notified. Any person aggrieved by the notified entry in the Register of Titles may file an objection before the District Land Titling Tribunal within three years of the notification. Additionally, the person may file an application with the TRO for an entry to be made in the Register of Titles. The TRO shall do so when the application has been admitted to the Tribunal. Minor errors in the Title of Registers can be rectified through an application to the TRO. V. Register of Titles After completion of records is notified by the Authority, the Register of Titles is prepared and maintained by the Authority. For each property, the Register will include: (a) general description, map, and locational details of the immovable property; (b) descriptive data such as a unique identification number, plot number, total area, built up and vacant area, address, site area, and undivided share in the land; (c) detail of survey entry, provisional title record, conclusive title record and status, mortgage, charges, other rights and interests in the property; (d) details of transfer of the property and past transactions; and (e) disputes pertaining to the property. Entries in the Register of Titles will serve as conclusive evidence of ownership. These entries shall be maintained in electronic form, indemnified, and kept in the public domain.

"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries.  Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny.  These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976.  Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community.  They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject.  In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not:  “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.”  This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues.  Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight.  The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament.  The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of   the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies.  Some of these are:

  1. The entire intelligence community, including all ancillary departments and officials, should be covered by the mandate of one or more parliamentary oversight bodies.
  2. The mandate of a parliamentary oversight body might include some or all of the following (a) legality, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency, (d) budgeting and accounting; (e) conformity with relevant human rights Conventions (f) policy/administrative aspects of the intelligence services.
  3. The recommendations and reports of the parliamentary oversight body should be (a) published; (b) debated in parliament; (c) monitored with regard to its implementation by the government and intelligence community.
  4. The resources and legal powers at the disposal of the parliamentary oversight body should match the scope of its mandate.
  5. Parliament should be responsible for appointing and, where necessary, removing members of a body exercising the oversight function in its name.
  6. Representation on parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-party, preferably in accordance with the strengths of the political parties in parliament.
  7. Government ministers should be debarred from membership (and parliamentarians should be required to step down if they are appointed as ministers) or the independence of the committee will be compromised. The same applies to former members of agencies overseen.
  8. The oversight body should have the legal power to initiate investigations; Members of oversight bodies should have unrestricted access to all information which is necessary for executing their oversight tasks.
  9. The oversight body should have power to subpoena witnesses and to receive testimony under oath.
  10. The oversight body should take appropriate measures and steps in order to protect information from unauthorised disclosure.
  11. The committee should report to parliament at least yearly or as often as it deems necessary.
  12. The oversight body should have access to all relevant budget documents, provided that safeguards are in place to avoid leaking of classified information.