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Recently there have been news reports about the NITI Aayog submitting its recommendations on improving the financial health of Air India to the Ministry of Finance.[1],[2] The Civil Aviation Ministers have also mentioned that the Ministry will soon propose a roadmap for the rejuvenation of the national airline. While the NITI Aayog report is not out in the public domain yet, we present a few details on the financial health of the airline.
Finances of Air India
In 2015-16, Air India earned a revenue of Rs 20,526 crore and registered losses of Rs 3,837 crore. As of March 31, 2015, the total debt of Air India was at Rs 51,367 crore.[3] This includes Rs 22,574 crore outstanding on account of aircraft loans. The figure below shows the losses incurred by Air India in the last few years (2007-16).
According to the Ministry of Civil Aviation, reasons for Air India’s losses include: (i) the adverse impact of exchange rate variation due to the weakening of Indian Rupee, (ii) high interest burden, (iii) increase in competition, especially from low cost carriers, and (iv) high fuel prices.[4] The National Transport Development Policy Committee (NTDPC), in its report in 2013, had observed that with the increase in the number of airlines in the market, Air India has been struggling to make a transition from a monopoly market to a competitive one.[5] These struggles have been primarily regarding improving its efficiency, and competing with the private airlines.
Turnaround Plan and Financial Restructuring
In order to bail out the company, the government had approved the Turnaround Plan (TAP) and Financial Restructuring Plan (FRP) of Air India in April 2012.[6] Under the plans, the government would infuse equity into Air India subject to meeting certain milestones such as Pay Load Factor (measures capacity utilisation), on time performance, fleet utilisation, yield factor (average fare paid per mile, per passenger), and rationalisation of the emolument structure of employees.7 The equity infusion included financial support towards the repayment of the principal, as well as the interest payments on the government loans for aircraft acquisition. Under the TAP/FRP, the central government was to infuse Rs 30,231 crore till 2020-21. As of 2016-17, the Ministry has infused an equity amount of Rs 24,745 crore.[7]
In 2017-18, the Ministry has allocated Rs 1,800 crore towards Air India which is 67% of the Ministry’s total budget for the year.[8] However, this amount is 30% lower than the TAP commitment of Rs 2,587 crore.3 In 2016-17, while Air India had sought and equity infusion of Rs 3,901 crore, the government approved Rs 2,465 crore as the equity infusion.[9] The Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism, and Culture examining the 2017-18 budget estimates noted that reducing the equity infusion in Air India might adversely affect the financial situation of the company.[10] It recommended that the government must allocate the amount committed under TAP. The Ministry had also observed that due to reduction of equity infusion, Air India has to arrange funds through borrowing which costs additional amount of interest to be paid by the government.[11]
As per the Ministry, Air India has achieved most of the targets set out in TAP.[12] Despite running into losses, it achieved an operating profit of Rs 105 crore in FY 2015-16.[13] Air India’s performance in some of the segments are provided in the table below.
Table 1: Air India’s performance
2011-12 | 2014-15 | |
Overall Network On Time Performance (measures adherence to time schedule) | 68.2% | 72.7% |
Passenger Load Factor (measures capacity utilisation of the airline) | 67.9% | 73.7% |
Network Yield achieved (in Rs/ RPKM)* | 3.74 | 4.35 |
Number of Revenue Passengers (in million) | 13.4 | 16.9 |
Operating Loss (in Rs crore) | 5,139 | 2,171 |
* Note: RPKM or Revenue Passenger Kilometre performed refers to number of seats for which the carrier has earned revenue.
Sources: Lok Sabha Questions; PRS.
The NTDPC had observed that with its excessive and unproductive manpower, failure to invest in the technology required to keep it competitive, and poor operations, Air India’s future looks risky. It had also questioned the rationale for a national airline. It had suggested that the government must frame a decisive policy with regard to Air India, and clarify its future accordingly.5 It had recommended that Air India’s liabilities should be written off and be dealt with separately, and the airline should be run on complete operational and financial autonomy.5
Need for competitive framework in the sector
With the entrance of several private players in the market, the domestic aviation market has grown significantly in the last decade. The market share of an airline is directly related to its capacity share in the market. While private carriers have added capacity in the domestic market, the capacity induction (adding more aircrafts) of Air India has not kept up with the private carriers. This has resulted in decrease in market share of Air India from 17% in 2008-09 to 14% in 2016-17.[14]
The Committee looking at the competitive framework of the civil aviation sector had observed that the national carrier gets preferential treatment through access to government funding, and flying rights.[15] It had recommended that competitive neutrality should be ensured between private carriers and the national carrier, which could be achieved by removing the regulations that provide such preferential treatment to Air India. The NTDPC had also noted that the presence of a state-owned enterprise should not distort the market for other private players.6 It had recommended that the Ministry should consider developing regulations that improve the overall financial health of the airline sector.
While Air India’s performance has improved following the TAP, along with the equity infusion from government, its debt still remains high and has been gradually increasing. In light of this, it remains to be seen what the government will propose with regard to the rejuvenation of the national airline, and ensure a competitive and fair market for all the players in the airline market.
[1] “Govt to prepare Air India revival plan within 3 months, amid calls for privatization”, Livemint, May 31, 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/0koi5Hyidj1gVD3wOWTruM/Govt-says-all-options-open-for-Air-India-revival.html.
[2] “Air India selloff: Fixing airline’s future is more important than past”, Financial Express, May 31, 2017, http://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/why-fixing-air-indias-future-more-important-than-past/693777/.
[3] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 382, Ministry of Civil Aviation, February 25, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=28931&lsno=16.
[4] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 353, Ministry of Civil Aviation, November 17, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=40733&lsno=16.
[5] “Volume 3, Chapter 3: Civil Aviation”, India Transport Report: Moving India to 2032, National Transport Development Policy Committee, June 17, 2014, http://planningcommission.nic.in/sectors/NTDPC/volume3_p1/civil_v3_p1.pdf.
[6] “Government Approves Financial Restructuring and Turn Around Plan of Air India”, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA), April 12, 2012, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=82231.
[7] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 472, Ministry of Civil Aviation, April 6, 2017, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=51752&lsno=16.
[8] Notes on Demands for Grants 2017-18, Demand no 9, Ministry of Civil Aviation, http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2017-18/eb/sbe9.pdf.
[9] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 4809, Ministry of Civil Aviation, March 30, 2017, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=51108&lsno=16.
[10] “244th report: Demand for Grants (2017-18) of Ministry of Civil Aviation”, Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture, March 17, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Transport,%20Tourism%20and%20Culture/244.pdf.
[11] “218th report: Demand for Grants (2015-16) of Ministry of Civil Aviation”, Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture, April 28, 2015.
[12] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 307, Ministry of Civil Aviation, February 25, 2016, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/7/AU307.pdf.
[13] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 1566, Ministry of Civil Aviation, March 9, 2017, http://www.loksabha.nic.in/Members/QResult16.aspx?qref=47532.
[14] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 312, Ministry of Civil Aviation, March 23, 2017, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=49742&lsno=16.
[15] Report of the Committee Constituted for examination of the recommendations made in the Study Report on Competitive Framework of Civil Aviation Sector in India, Ministry of Civil Aviation, June 2012, http://civilaviation.gov.in/sites/default/files/moca_001870_0.pdf.
Recently, there have been instances of certain collective investment schemes (CISs) attempting to circumvent regulatory oversight. In addition, some market participants have not complied with Securities and Exchange Board of India's (SEBI) orders of payment of penalty and refund to investors. In August, the Securities Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2013 was introduced in the Lok Sabha to amend the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (the SEBI Act, 1992), the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA, 1956) and the Depositories Act, 1996. The Bill replaced the Securities Laws (Amendments) Ordinance, 2013. The Bill makes the following key amendments: a) Definition of Collective Investment Schemes The SEBI Act, 1992 defines CISs as schemes in which the funds of investors are pooled, yield profits or income and are managed on behalf of investors. It also exempts certain types of investments which are regulated by other authorities. The Bill introduces a proviso to the definition of CIS. This proviso deems any scheme or arrangement to be a CIS if it meets all three of the following conditions: (a) funds are pooled, (b) it is not registered with SEBI, or it is not exempted by SEBI Act, 1992, and (c) it has a corpus of Rs 100 crore or more. These provisions could potentially lead to some schemes not conventionally defined as CIS to fall under the definition. For instance, partnership firms operating in the investment business or real estate developers accepting customer advances could be termed as CISs. SEBI has been given the power to specify conditions under which any scheme or arrangement can be defined as a CIS. This raises the question of whether this is excessive delegation of legislative powers - usually the parent act defines the entities to be regulated and the details are entrusted to the regulator. b) Disgorgement (repayment) of unfair gains/ averted losses SEBI has in the past issued orders directing market participants to refund i) profits made or ii) losses averted, through unfair actions. The Bill deems SEBI to have always had the power to direct a market participant to disgorge unfair gains made/losses averted, without approaching a court. This power to order disgorgement without approaching a court is in contrast with the provisions of the recently passed Companies Bill, 2011 and the draft Indian Financial Code (IFC) which require an order from a court/tribunal for disgorgement of unfair gains. Further, the Bill specifies that the disgorged amount shall be credited to the Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF), and shall be used in accordance with SEBI regulations. The Bill does not explicitly provide the first right on the disgorged funds to those who suffered wrongful losses due to the unfair actions, unlike the draft IFC. c) Investigation and prosecution The Bill empowers the SEBI chairman to authorise search and seizure operations on a suspect’s premises. This does away with the current requirement of permission from a Judicial Magistrate. This provision removes the usual safeguards regarding search and seizure as seen in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the recently passed Companies Bill, 2011 and the draft Indian Financial Code. The Bill also empowers an authorised SEBI officer to, without approaching a court, attach a person’s bank accounts and property and even arrest and detain the person in prison for non-compliance of a disgorgement order or penalty order. Most regulators and authorities, with the exception of the Department of Income Tax, do not have powers to such an extent. d) Other Provisions of the Bill The Bill retrospectively validates consent guidelines issued by SEBI in 2007 under which SEBI can settle non-criminal cases through consent orders, i.e., parties can make out-of-court settlements through payment of fine/compensation. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission settles over 90% of non-criminal cases by consent orders. The Bill retrospectively validates the exchange of information between SEBI and foreign securities regulators through MoUs. The Bill sets up special courts to try cases relating to offences under the SEBI Act, 1992. For a PRS summary of the Bill, here.