The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021 was introduced in Lok Sabha today.  It seeks to dissolve certain existing appellate bodies and transfer their functions (such as adjudication of appeals) to existing judicial bodies (mainly high courts) (see Table 1).  It also amends the Finance Act, 2017, to bring certain provisions (such as qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances of tribunal members) under the purview of the Bill.  Currently, these provisions are notified through Rules under the Finance Act, 2017.   

Note that the 2017 Act reorganised the Indian tribunal system to ensure uniformity in their administration by amalgamating certain tribunals based on the similarity in their functional domain.  It also delegated powers to the central government to make Rules to provide for the qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances, removal, and other conditions of service for chairpersons and members of these tribunals.  

This Bill replaces an Ordinance with similar provisions that was promulgated in April 2021.   The 2021 Ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court over its compliance with past Supreme Court judgements.  In July 2021, the Court struck down certain provisions of the Ordinance, such as the four-year term of office for members, and the minimum age bar of 50 years to be appointed as a member of a tribunal.  Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of key provisions of the 2021 Bill with the 2021 Ordinance and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgement.  The Bill does not conform to the judgement of the Supreme Court and retains the provisions of the Ordinance that were struck down by the Court. 

For an analysis of the 2021 Ordinance, please see our note here.  For more details on the evolution of the tribunal system in India, please see our note

Table 1: Transfer of functions of key appellate bodies as proposed under the Bill

Appellate body

Role

Proposed entity

Appellate Tribunal under the Cinematograph Act, 1952

Adjudication of appeals against the Board of Film Certification

High Court

Appellate Board under the Trade Marks Act, 1999

Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar

High Court

Appellate Board under the Copyright Act, 1957

Adjudication of certain disputes and appeals against orders of the Registrar of Copyright.   Disputes include those related to publications and term of the copyright

Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of a High Court*

Authority for Advance Rulings under the Customs Act, 1962

Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Customs Authority for advance rulings

High Court

Appellate Board under The Patents Act, 1970

Adjudication of appeals against decisions of the Controller on certain matters.  Matters include applications for patents and restoration of patents.

High Court

Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994

Adjudication of:

  • disputes arising from the disposal of properties left on airport premises by unauthorised occupants, and
  • for appeals against the order of an eviction officer
  • Central government, for disputes arising from the disposal of properties left on airport premises by unauthorised occupants.
  • High Court, for appeals against orders of an eviction officer.

Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002

Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Highway Administration on matters including, grant of lease or licence of highway land, removal of unauthorised occupation, and prevention of damage to highway.

Civil Court# 

Appellate Tribunal under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001

Adjudication of appeals against certain orders of Registrar or Plant Varieties and Farmer Rights Authority

High Court

Appellate Board under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999

Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar

High Court

Notes: * Constituted under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; # Refers to a Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Parent Acts of the appellate bodies; PRS.

Table 2: Key provisions in the 2021 Bill and the Ordinance vis-a-vis the Supreme Court judgements

Provisions

2021 Ordinance

Supreme Court Judgement of July 2021

2021 Bill

Term of office of Chairperson and members

Four-year term with eligibility for re-appointment.

The Court stated that a short tenure of members (such as three years) along with provisions of re-appointment increases the influence and control of the Executive over the judiciary.  In a short tenure, by the time the members achieve the required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term gets over.  This prevents enhancement of adjudicatory experience, thereby, impacting the efficacy of tribunals.

The Court struck down the provision of four -year term and reiterated its past judgements, which recommended a five-year term with eligibility for re-appointment.  

Same as that in Ordinance.

Minimum age requirement for appointment of Chairperson and members

50 years

The Court observed that the minimum age requirement of 50 years violates past Court judgements, where the Court has stated that advocates with at least 10 years of relevant experience must be eligible to be appointed as judicial members, as that is the qualification required for a High Court judge.  Such a high age limit also prevents the recruitment of young talent.

The provision was struck down.

Same as that in Ordinance.

Time limit for appointments

Preferably within three months from the date of the recommendations of the search-cum-selection committee.

The Court noted that not mandating the central government to make appointments within three months (from the date of recommendation of the search-cum-selection committee) leads to delay in the appointment of members.  This impacts the functioning and efficacy of tribunals.

The provision was struck down over non-compliance with past judgements, which mandated the appointments to be made within three months.

Same as that in Ordinance.

Number of recommendations for a post

Two names for each post.

The Court stated that the recommendations for appointment of members by the search-cum-selection committee should be final.  The Executive must not be allowed to exercise any discretion in matter of appointments in a tribunal.

The Court struck down the provision and reiterated its past judgement, which specified that the selection committee must suggest one name for each post.  The Committee may recommend one name in wait list.  

Same as that in Ordinance.

Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021; The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Madras Bar Association vs Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 000502 of 2021; PRS.

Most legislative assemblies make Parliament look like a paragon of virtue A COUPLE of days ago, an MLA from Orissa made news for climbing on to the speaker's table in the assembly. Not so long ago, television screens beamed images of Karnataka MLAs snacking and sleeping all night in the assembly. But these are only indicative of the incidents of the raucous behaviour of several MLAs in the recent past across the country. And the poor behaviour of some MLAs is only one aspect of the pitiable state of several of our state legislatures. The other aspect of our state legislatures that goes largely unnoticed is how poorly the secretariats of legislatures are equipped and how several systems that are seen as essential in Parliament are nonexistent in states. Even to know the complete picture of how our legislatures function, you need data. And several state assemblies are notoriously poor at putting out data on the functioning of the institution or the MLAs. After one gets used to the quality of Parliament websites and the regularity of their updates, it would be shocking to see that there are some state legislatures that do not even have functional websites. It has been observed that some state legislatures are lagging behind by a couple of years in compiling the "resume of work" which summarises the work done in a session of the legislature. So the first bottleneck in several instances is the inability to access data of the assembly. From the data we have managed to access, it is obvious that state assemblies meet for very few days a year. A case in point is the Punjab assembly which has met for an average of 19 days per year for a 10-year period between 1997 and 2007. Delhi was only marginally better averaging 21 days per year during the same period. Kerala has averaged some 50 days a year for several years now. Some states like Karnataka have legislated that they should meet for at least 60 days a year, but since passing that legislation in 2005, they have not managed to do so for even one year. I am not even accounting for the time lost due to disruptions. Bills are passed with little or no discussion in many state legislatures. While in Parliament, referring bills to the standing committees is the norm, most state legislatures do not have standing committees. The only examination of a bill, if any, happens on the floor of the House. And if data from the Delhi assembly is anything to go by, the average debate on a bill before is passed is a little over half hour. There are any number of instances where bills are introduced and passed in state assemblies on the same day -so there is not even a pretence of the need for MLAs to read, understand and deliberate on the provisions of legislation they are supposedly passing. MLAs are often far more narrowly constituency-focused than MPs are. On average, MLAs have lower education levels than members of Parliament. There is no formal definition of a role of an MLA, and they mostly have no exposure to ideas such as the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. In one particularly revealing conversation with an MLA, he said, "At the time of elections, each of the contestants represents his party. But after the elections, the chiefministerbecomestheleader of all MLAs in the House. If an MLAneedssomeadditionalprojects/ favours for his constituency he needs to be in the good books of the chief minister and his cabinet ministers. So where is the question of taking on the chief minister on the floor of the House on any issue?" There are many aspects of state legislatures that point to a steady and visible decline of these important institutions. But beyond the frequent highlighting of theatrics by some MLAs, there is almost no public discourse on this issue. It is necessary to ensure that the legislatures run smoothly, and the speaker, as first among equals, has the biggest responsibility to ensure this. If there are rules and everyone knows that those rules will never be used to enforce discipline, then the rules will be broken, and repeatedly so. This practice needs to be urgently reviewed. The larger question is whether our legislatures are the highest deliberating and policymaking bodies or whether they are being reduced to platforms for political theatrics. Policy can almost never be devoid of politics and public posturing. But if this means poor deliberation of critical policy issues and the woefully inadequate functioning of our legislatures, then we may need to come up with creative ways in which this problem can be addressed. This article appeared in the Indian Express on December 20, 2010.