The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021 was introduced in Lok Sabha today. It seeks to dissolve certain existing appellate bodies and transfer their functions (such as adjudication of appeals) to existing judicial bodies (mainly high courts) (see Table 1). It also amends the Finance Act, 2017, to bring certain provisions (such as qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances of tribunal members) under the purview of the Bill. Currently, these provisions are notified through Rules under the Finance Act, 2017.
Note that the 2017 Act reorganised the Indian tribunal system to ensure uniformity in their administration by amalgamating certain tribunals based on the similarity in their functional domain. It also delegated powers to the central government to make Rules to provide for the qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances, removal, and other conditions of service for chairpersons and members of these tribunals.
This Bill replaces an Ordinance with similar provisions that was promulgated in April 2021. The 2021 Ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court over its compliance with past Supreme Court judgements. In July 2021, the Court struck down certain provisions of the Ordinance, such as the four-year term of office for members, and the minimum age bar of 50 years to be appointed as a member of a tribunal. Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of key provisions of the 2021 Bill with the 2021 Ordinance and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgement. The Bill does not conform to the judgement of the Supreme Court and retains the provisions of the Ordinance that were struck down by the Court.
For an analysis of the 2021 Ordinance, please see our note here. For more details on the evolution of the tribunal system in India, please see our note.
Table 1: Transfer of functions of key appellate bodies as proposed under the Bill
|
Appellate body |
Role |
Proposed entity |
|
Appellate Tribunal under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 |
Adjudication of appeals against the Board of Film Certification |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Copyright Act, 1957 |
Adjudication of certain disputes and appeals against orders of the Registrar of Copyright. Disputes include those related to publications and term of the copyright |
Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of a High Court* |
|
Authority for Advance Rulings under the Customs Act, 1962 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Customs Authority for advance rulings |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under The Patents Act, 1970 |
Adjudication of appeals against decisions of the Controller on certain matters. Matters include applications for patents and restoration of patents. |
High Court |
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 |
Adjudication of:
|
|
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Highway Administration on matters including, grant of lease or licence of highway land, removal of unauthorised occupation, and prevention of damage to highway. |
Civil Court# |
|
Appellate Tribunal under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 |
Adjudication of appeals against certain orders of Registrar or Plant Varieties and Farmer Rights Authority |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
Notes: * Constituted under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; # Refers to a Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Parent Acts of the appellate bodies; PRS.
Table 2: Key provisions in the 2021 Bill and the Ordinance vis-a-vis the Supreme Court judgements
|
Provisions |
2021 Ordinance |
Supreme Court Judgement of July 2021 |
2021 Bill |
|
Term of office of Chairperson and members |
Four-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
The Court stated that a short tenure of members (such as three years) along with provisions of re-appointment increases the influence and control of the Executive over the judiciary. In a short tenure, by the time the members achieve the required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term gets over. This prevents enhancement of adjudicatory experience, thereby, impacting the efficacy of tribunals. The Court struck down the provision of four -year term and reiterated its past judgements, which recommended a five-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Minimum age requirement for appointment of Chairperson and members |
50 years |
The Court observed that the minimum age requirement of 50 years violates past Court judgements, where the Court has stated that advocates with at least 10 years of relevant experience must be eligible to be appointed as judicial members, as that is the qualification required for a High Court judge. Such a high age limit also prevents the recruitment of young talent. The provision was struck down. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Time limit for appointments |
Preferably within three months from the date of the recommendations of the search-cum-selection committee. |
The Court noted that not mandating the central government to make appointments within three months (from the date of recommendation of the search-cum-selection committee) leads to delay in the appointment of members. This impacts the functioning and efficacy of tribunals. The provision was struck down over non-compliance with past judgements, which mandated the appointments to be made within three months. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Number of recommendations for a post |
Two names for each post. |
The Court stated that the recommendations for appointment of members by the search-cum-selection committee should be final. The Executive must not be allowed to exercise any discretion in matter of appointments in a tribunal. The Court struck down the provision and reiterated its past judgement, which specified that the selection committee must suggest one name for each post. The Committee may recommend one name in wait list. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021; The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Madras Bar Association vs Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 000502 of 2021; PRS.
"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries. Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny. These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976. Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community. They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject. In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not: “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.” This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues. Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight. The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament. The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies. Some of these are:
