The trust vote drama in Karnataka has hit the national headlines. The incumbent chief minister, B.S. Yeddyurappa appears to have won the first round. It remains to be seen how the BJP responds to the governor’s direction that a second trust vote be held by the 14th of this month. In the 225-member Karnataka assembly, the ruling BJP had a wafer-thin majority since the 2008 assembly elections. And it was not surprising to find that some political forces in the state felt that there was an opportunity to unseat the government. But what has transpired over the past few days has once again reminded citizens of the ugly side of politics. Leading up to the trust vote, the governor of Karnataka wrote a letter to the speaker of the Karnataka assembly asking that no MLAs be disqualified before the trust vote was conducted on the floor of the assembly. Subsequently, there have been a number of allegations about the conduct of the trust vote itself. The governor openly called the trust vote “farcical”, and wrote to the Centre asking that President’s Rule be imposed in the state, before he directed the government to prove its majority again. This phenomenon of trust votes is not uncommon in our dynamic political culture. Just before the 2009 general elections, the BJD and the BJP had differences over seat-sharing in Orissa. The BJP decided to withdraw support to the Naveen Patnaik government. The BJD passed the floor test by a voice vote. While the opposition claims that the process was not fair, the BJD leadership has maintained that there was no request for a division, which would have required recorded voting. The relatively small Goa assembly has seen a number of similar occurrences in the recent past, with governments changing as a result. But there are some critical issues that merit examination. In some recent trust votes, there have been allegations that large amounts of money have been exchanged. Of course, following the 2008 trust vote in the Lok Sabha on the India-US nuclear agreement, the infamous cash-for-votes scam broke out, with wads of cash being shown on the floor of the House. In the Karnataka trust vote, too, there have been allegations that large amounts of money have changed hands. The second issue is how some of these trust votes are managed on the floor of the House. Both the recent Orissa episode and the ongoing Karnataka one have been very contentious about the procedure that has been used to prove the majority. In both cases, the opposition alleged that they asked for a division, which would require a physical count of votes rather than just a voice vote, and in both cases a division was not held. A parallel issue which needs to be kept in mind is the governor’s power to ensure compliance with procedure in the state legislatures. The third issue that needs some discussion is whether the decision on defections should be judged by the speaker, usually a member of the ruling party or coalition, or by a neutral external body, such as the Election Commission. In the latest episode in Karnataka, the speaker has disqualified MLAs on the ground that they have voluntarily exited the party under which they were elected. In a 1994 case (Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India), the Supreme Court ruled that the words “voluntarily giving up membership” have a wider meaning. An inference can also be drawn from the conduct of the member that he has voluntarily given up the membership of his party. There is a huge paradox in the anti-defection law that was passed 25 years ago. While MLAs and MPs vote along party lines on ordinary legislation, they do not appear to be daunted by the consequences in the case of trust votes. So, in effect, the anti-defection law appears to be effective in controlling members of all parties on policy-making — which could in fact benefit from more open input from across party lines — but ineffective in several cases with regard to trust votes. Clearly, there is much more at stake for all concerned in trust votes, and therefore the scope for greater negotiation. Politics in our large and complex democracy is fiercely competitive. Dissidence is to be expected because there are too many people vying for too few of the top positions. While there are no perfect solutions, the only sustainable and meaningful approach is to encourage inner-party democracy so as to enable a selection process for positions of responsibility that is accepted as free and fair by all concerned. While the political uncertainty continues, the only certainty for India’s citizens is a very unhealthy politics for some time to come. - CV Madhukar This article was published in Indian Express on October 13, 2010

Last week, oil-marketing companies (or OMCs, such as Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) raised the price of domestic LPG in the country. [1]  The price of a domestic cylinder (14.2kg) has increased from Rs 714 in January 2020 to Rs 858.5 in February 2020.  This is a 20% hike in the price of a LPG cylinder.  Note that this is the sixth consecutive month for which LPG prices have been revised upwards.  Figure 1 shows the variation in price of a domestic (non-subsidised) LPG cylinder in Delhi over the last year.

Figure 1: Variation in price of non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder

 

Sources:  Indian Oil and Corporation Limited; PRS.

How is the price of LPG cylinders determined?

LPG prices are revised every month.  The price is determined by public sector OMCs namely, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, in line with the changes in the international market prices and other market conditions. [2]  The international market price affects the import parity price of petroleum products (the price that importers pay for import of product at the respective Indian ports).  This includes exchange rate, ocean freight, insurance and customs duty among others.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has stated that the recent hike in the price of LPG cylinder is due to a sharp rise in international LPG prices during January 2020 (from USD 448/Metric Tonne to USD 567/Metric Tonne). [3] 

What is the difference between the price of a subsidised and non-subsidised cylinder?

The price determined by the OMCs reflects the price of a non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder.  The government modulates the effective price to provide subsidised LPG cylinders to consumers under the 'Pratyaksha Hastaantarit Laabh' direct benefit transfer (or DBT-PAHAL) scheme. [4]   Under the scheme, a consumer (with annual income of up to Rs 10 lakh) can avail DBT cash-subsidy for a LPG cylinder.   The beneficiaries buy LPG cylinders at market rate and subsequently receive subsidy directly in their bank accounts.  

With the recent increase in price of a LPG cylinder, the government has increased the subsidy amount for PAHAL consumers from Rs. 153.86 per cylinder to Rs. 291.48 per cylinder (89% increase).3   This is done to ensure that the subsidized LPG consumers are insulated from the volatility of LPG prices in the international market.  Table 1 shows the amount of subsidy provided by the government for LPG cylinder.  Note that price of a subsidised cylinder has increased from Rs 494 to Rs 567 (14.8%) from February 2019 to February 2020. 

Table 1: Difference between the price of subsidised and non-subsidised LPG cylinder

As on

Non-subsidised cylinder

Subsidised cylinder

Subsidy

February 2018

Rs 736.00

Rs 495.63

Rs 240.37

February 2019

Rs 659.00

Rs 493.53

Rs 165.47

February 2020

Rs 858.50

Rs 567.02

Rs 291.48

Sources: Unstarred Question No.1211, February 13, 2019, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Rajya Sabha.
 Note: Prices are at Delhi. 

How many people avail the subsidy on LPG cylinders?

Currently, there are a total of 27.16 crore LPG (domestic) connections in the country.3  Of these, 26.12 crore (94%) consumers are beneficiaries under the PAHAL scheme, and therefore, can avail LPG cylinders at subsidised rates.  Note that, under the scheme, a maximum of 12 subsidised cylinders per year can be availed under one connection.  Further, a household cannot have more than one connection. 

What is the cost of subsidy for the government?

The subsidy on domestic LPG is met through the budgetary grants of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.  In 2020-21, the government is estimated to spend Rs 37,256 crore on LPG subsidy.   This includes Rs 35,605 crore for DBT-PAHAL and Rs 1,118 crore for Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana.  This is an increase of 9.3% from the expenditure in 2019-20 of Rs 34,086 crore (revised estimate).  Note that LPG subsidy constitutes 87% of the Ministry's total budget (Rs 42,901 crore).   

Figure 2 below shows the year-wise expenditure on LPG subsidy, and as a proportion of the total budget of the Ministry from 2015-16 to 2020-21. 

Figure 2: LPG subsidy over the years (2015-16 to 2020-21). 

Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.

For more trends and analysis related to the finances of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, see  here

[1] "LPG price hiked by Rs 144.5 per cylinder", Economic Times, February 12, 2020,  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/lpg-price-hiked-by-rs-144-5-per-cylinder/articleshow/74096745.cms.

[2] Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell,  https://www.ppac.gov.in/content/137_3_Faq.aspx.

[3] "LPG Price is Derived based on International Market Price", Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, February 13, 2020. 

[4] PAHAL-Direct Benefits Transfer for LPG (DBTL) Consumers Scheme, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas,  http://petroleum.nic.in/dbt/whatisdbtl.html.