The trust vote drama in Karnataka has hit the national headlines. The incumbent chief minister, B.S. Yeddyurappa appears to have won the first round. It remains to be seen how the BJP responds to the governor’s direction that a second trust vote be held by the 14th of this month. In the 225-member Karnataka assembly, the ruling BJP had a wafer-thin majority since the 2008 assembly elections. And it was not surprising to find that some political forces in the state felt that there was an opportunity to unseat the government. But what has transpired over the past few days has once again reminded citizens of the ugly side of politics. Leading up to the trust vote, the governor of Karnataka wrote a letter to the speaker of the Karnataka assembly asking that no MLAs be disqualified before the trust vote was conducted on the floor of the assembly. Subsequently, there have been a number of allegations about the conduct of the trust vote itself. The governor openly called the trust vote “farcical”, and wrote to the Centre asking that President’s Rule be imposed in the state, before he directed the government to prove its majority again. This phenomenon of trust votes is not uncommon in our dynamic political culture. Just before the 2009 general elections, the BJD and the BJP had differences over seat-sharing in Orissa. The BJP decided to withdraw support to the Naveen Patnaik government. The BJD passed the floor test by a voice vote. While the opposition claims that the process was not fair, the BJD leadership has maintained that there was no request for a division, which would have required recorded voting. The relatively small Goa assembly has seen a number of similar occurrences in the recent past, with governments changing as a result. But there are some critical issues that merit examination. In some recent trust votes, there have been allegations that large amounts of money have been exchanged. Of course, following the 2008 trust vote in the Lok Sabha on the India-US nuclear agreement, the infamous cash-for-votes scam broke out, with wads of cash being shown on the floor of the House. In the Karnataka trust vote, too, there have been allegations that large amounts of money have changed hands. The second issue is how some of these trust votes are managed on the floor of the House. Both the recent Orissa episode and the ongoing Karnataka one have been very contentious about the procedure that has been used to prove the majority. In both cases, the opposition alleged that they asked for a division, which would require a physical count of votes rather than just a voice vote, and in both cases a division was not held. A parallel issue which needs to be kept in mind is the governor’s power to ensure compliance with procedure in the state legislatures. The third issue that needs some discussion is whether the decision on defections should be judged by the speaker, usually a member of the ruling party or coalition, or by a neutral external body, such as the Election Commission. In the latest episode in Karnataka, the speaker has disqualified MLAs on the ground that they have voluntarily exited the party under which they were elected. In a 1994 case (Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India), the Supreme Court ruled that the words “voluntarily giving up membership” have a wider meaning. An inference can also be drawn from the conduct of the member that he has voluntarily given up the membership of his party. There is a huge paradox in the anti-defection law that was passed 25 years ago. While MLAs and MPs vote along party lines on ordinary legislation, they do not appear to be daunted by the consequences in the case of trust votes. So, in effect, the anti-defection law appears to be effective in controlling members of all parties on policy-making — which could in fact benefit from more open input from across party lines — but ineffective in several cases with regard to trust votes. Clearly, there is much more at stake for all concerned in trust votes, and therefore the scope for greater negotiation. Politics in our large and complex democracy is fiercely competitive. Dissidence is to be expected because there are too many people vying for too few of the top positions. While there are no perfect solutions, the only sustainable and meaningful approach is to encourage inner-party democracy so as to enable a selection process for positions of responsibility that is accepted as free and fair by all concerned. While the political uncertainty continues, the only certainty for India’s citizens is a very unhealthy politics for some time to come. - CV Madhukar This article was published in Indian Express on October 13, 2010
Earlier this week, Rajya Sabha passed the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (Amendment) Bill, 2019, and the Bill is now pending in Lok Sabha. The Bill amends the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008. The Act established the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (AERA). AERA regulates tariffs and other charges for aeronautical services provided at civilian airports with annual traffic above 15 lakh passengers. It also monitors the performance standard of services across these airports. In this post, we explain the amendments that the Bill seeks to bring in and some of the issues around the functioning of the regulator.
Why was AERA created, and what is its role?
Few years back, private players started operating civilian airports. Typically, airports run the risk of becoming a monopoly because cities usually have one civilian airport which controls all aeronautical services in that area. To ensure that private airport operators do not misuse their monopoly, the need for an independent tariff regulator in the airport sector was felt. Consequently, the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008 (AERA Act) was passed which set up AERA.
AERA regulates tariffs and other charges (development fee and passenger service fee) for aeronautical services (air traffic management, landing and parking of aircraft, ground handling services) at major airports. Major airports include civilian airports with annual traffic above 15 lakh passengers. In 2018-19, there were 32 such airports (see Table 1). As of June 2019, 27 of these are being regulated by AERA (AERA also regulates tariffs at the Kannur airport which was used by 89,127 passengers in 2018-19). For the remaining airports, tariffs are determined by the Airports Authority of India (AAI), which is a body under the Ministry of Civil Aviation that also operates airports.
What changes are being proposed in the Bill?
The Bill seeks to do two things:
Definition of major airports: Currently, the AERA Act defines a major airport as one with annual passenger traffic over 15 lakh, or any other airports as notified by the central government. The Bill increases the threshold of annual passenger traffic for major airports to over 35 lakh.
Tariff determination by AERA: Under the Act, AERA is responsible for determining the: (i) tariff for aeronautical services every five years, (ii) development fees, and (iii) passengers service fee. It can also amend the tariffs in the interim period. The Bill adds that AERA will not determine: (i) tariff, (ii) tariff structures, or (iii) development fees, in certain cases. These cases include those where such tariff amounts were a part of the bid document on the basis of which the airport operations were awarded. AERA will be consulted (by the concessioning authority, the Ministry of Civil Aviation) before incorporating such tariffs in the bid document, and such tariffs must be notified.
Why is the Act getting amended?
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill states that the exponential growth of the sector has put tremendous pressure on AERA, while its resources are limited. Therefore, if too many airports come under the purview of AERA, it will not be able to perform its functions efficiently. If the challenge for AERA is availability of limited resources, the question is whether this problem may be resolved by reducing its jurisdiction (as the Bill is doing), or by improving its capacity.
Will the proposed amendments strengthen the role of the regulator?
When AERA was created in 2008, there were 11 airports with annual passenger traffic over 15 lakh. With increase in passenger traffic across airports, currently 32 airports are above this threshold. The Bill increases the threshold of annual passenger traffic for major airports to over 35 lakh. With this increase in threshold, 16 airports will be regulated by AERA. It may be argued that instead of strengthening the role of the regulator, its purview is being reduced.
Before AERA was set up, the Airports Authority of India (AAI) fixed the aeronautical charges for the airports under its control and prescribed performance standards for all airports and monitored them. Various committees had noted that AAI performed the role of airport operator as well as the regulator, which resulted in conflict of interest. Further, there was a natural monopoly in airports and air traffic control. In order to regulate the growing competition in the airline industry, and to provide a level playing field among different categories of airports, AERA was set up. During the deliberations of the Standing Committee examining the AERA Bill, 2007, the Ministry of Civil Aviation had noted that AERA should regulate tariff and monitor performance standards only at major airports. Depending upon future developments in the sector, other functions could be subsequently assigned to the regulator.
How would the Bill affect the regulatory regime?
Currently, there are 32 major airports (annual traffic above 15 lakh), and AERA regulates tariffs at 27 of these. As per the Bill, AERA will regulate 16 major airports (annual traffic above 35 lakh). The remaining 16 airports will be regulated by AAI. Till 2030-31, air traffic in the country is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 10-11%. This implies that in a few years, the traffic at the other 16 airports will increase to over 35 lakh and they will again fall under the purview of AERA. This may lead to constant changes in the regulatory regime at these airports. The table below provides the current list of major airports:
Table 1: List of major airports in India (as on March 2019)
| Airports with annual traffic above 35 lakh | Airports with annual traffic between 15 and 35 lakh | ||||
|
Ahmedabad |
Goa |
Mumbai |
Amritsar |
Madurai* |
Srinagar |
|
Bengaluru |
Guwahati |
Patna |
Bagdogra |
Mangalore |
Trichy* |
|
Bhubaneswar |
Hyderabad |
Pune |
Calicut |
Nagpur |
Varanasi |
|
Chennai |
Jaipur |
Thiruvananthapuram |
Chandigarh |
Port Blair* |
Vishakhapatnam |
|
Cochin |
Kolkata |
Coimbatore |
Raipur* |
||
|
Delhi |
Lucknow |
Indore |
Ranchi* |
||
* - AERA does not regulate tariffs at these airports currently.
Sources: AAI Traffic News; AERA website; PRS.
