Earlier this week, Rajya Sabha passed the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (Amendment) Bill, 2019, and the Bill is now pending in Lok Sabha. The Bill amends the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008. The Act established the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (AERA). AERA regulates tariffs and other charges for aeronautical services provided at civilian airports with annual traffic above 15 lakh passengers. It also monitors the performance standard of services across these airports. In this post, we explain the amendments that the Bill seeks to bring in and some of the issues around the functioning of the regulator.
Why was AERA created, and what is its role?
Few years back, private players started operating civilian airports. Typically, airports run the risk of becoming a monopoly because cities usually have one civilian airport which controls all aeronautical services in that area. To ensure that private airport operators do not misuse their monopoly, the need for an independent tariff regulator in the airport sector was felt. Consequently, the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008 (AERA Act) was passed which set up AERA.
AERA regulates tariffs and other charges (development fee and passenger service fee) for aeronautical services (air traffic management, landing and parking of aircraft, ground handling services) at major airports. Major airports include civilian airports with annual traffic above 15 lakh passengers. In 2018-19, there were 32 such airports (see Table 1). As of June 2019, 27 of these are being regulated by AERA (AERA also regulates tariffs at the Kannur airport which was used by 89,127 passengers in 2018-19). For the remaining airports, tariffs are determined by the Airports Authority of India (AAI), which is a body under the Ministry of Civil Aviation that also operates airports.
What changes are being proposed in the Bill?
The Bill seeks to do two things:
Definition of major airports: Currently, the AERA Act defines a major airport as one with annual passenger traffic over 15 lakh, or any other airports as notified by the central government. The Bill increases the threshold of annual passenger traffic for major airports to over 35 lakh.
Tariff determination by AERA: Under the Act, AERA is responsible for determining the: (i) tariff for aeronautical services every five years, (ii) development fees, and (iii) passengers service fee. It can also amend the tariffs in the interim period. The Bill adds that AERA will not determine: (i) tariff, (ii) tariff structures, or (iii) development fees, in certain cases. These cases include those where such tariff amounts were a part of the bid document on the basis of which the airport operations were awarded. AERA will be consulted (by the concessioning authority, the Ministry of Civil Aviation) before incorporating such tariffs in the bid document, and such tariffs must be notified.
Why is the Act getting amended?
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill states that the exponential growth of the sector has put tremendous pressure on AERA, while its resources are limited. Therefore, if too many airports come under the purview of AERA, it will not be able to perform its functions efficiently. If the challenge for AERA is availability of limited resources, the question is whether this problem may be resolved by reducing its jurisdiction (as the Bill is doing), or by improving its capacity.
Will the proposed amendments strengthen the role of the regulator?
When AERA was created in 2008, there were 11 airports with annual passenger traffic over 15 lakh. With increase in passenger traffic across airports, currently 32 airports are above this threshold. The Bill increases the threshold of annual passenger traffic for major airports to over 35 lakh. With this increase in threshold, 16 airports will be regulated by AERA. It may be argued that instead of strengthening the role of the regulator, its purview is being reduced.
Before AERA was set up, the Airports Authority of India (AAI) fixed the aeronautical charges for the airports under its control and prescribed performance standards for all airports and monitored them. Various committees had noted that AAI performed the role of airport operator as well as the regulator, which resulted in conflict of interest. Further, there was a natural monopoly in airports and air traffic control. In order to regulate the growing competition in the airline industry, and to provide a level playing field among different categories of airports, AERA was set up. During the deliberations of the Standing Committee examining the AERA Bill, 2007, the Ministry of Civil Aviation had noted that AERA should regulate tariff and monitor performance standards only at major airports. Depending upon future developments in the sector, other functions could be subsequently assigned to the regulator.
How would the Bill affect the regulatory regime?
Currently, there are 32 major airports (annual traffic above 15 lakh), and AERA regulates tariffs at 27 of these. As per the Bill, AERA will regulate 16 major airports (annual traffic above 35 lakh). The remaining 16 airports will be regulated by AAI. Till 2030-31, air traffic in the country is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 10-11%. This implies that in a few years, the traffic at the other 16 airports will increase to over 35 lakh and they will again fall under the purview of AERA. This may lead to constant changes in the regulatory regime at these airports. The table below provides the current list of major airports:
Table 1: List of major airports in India (as on March 2019)
| Airports with annual traffic above 35 lakh | Airports with annual traffic between 15 and 35 lakh | ||||
|
Ahmedabad |
Goa |
Mumbai |
Amritsar |
Madurai* |
Srinagar |
|
Bengaluru |
Guwahati |
Patna |
Bagdogra |
Mangalore |
Trichy* |
|
Bhubaneswar |
Hyderabad |
Pune |
Calicut |
Nagpur |
Varanasi |
|
Chennai |
Jaipur |
Thiruvananthapuram |
Chandigarh |
Port Blair* |
Vishakhapatnam |
|
Cochin |
Kolkata |
Coimbatore |
Raipur* |
||
|
Delhi |
Lucknow |
Indore |
Ranchi* |
||
* - AERA does not regulate tariffs at these airports currently.
Sources: AAI Traffic News; AERA website; PRS.
Early this week, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India tabled a report on the finances of Uttar Pradesh for the financial year 2020-21. A few days prior to that, on May 26, the budget for Uttar Pradesh for 2022-23 was presented, along with which the final audited expenditure and receipt figures for the year 2020-21 were released. The year 2020-21 presented a two-fold challenge for states – loss in revenue due to impact of COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, and the need for increased expenditure to support affected persons and economic recovery. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh’s GSDP grew by 1.05% in 2020-21 as compared to a growth of 6.5% in 2019-20. The state reported a revenue deficit of Rs 2,367 crore in 2020-21 after reporting revenue surplus for 14 successive years since 2006-07. Revenue deficit is the excess of revenue expenditure over revenue receipts. This blog looks at the key trends in the finances of Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 and certain observations by CAG on fiscal management by the state.
Spending and Deficits in 2020-21
Underspending: In 2020-21, total spending by the state was 26% less than the budget estimate presented in February 2020. In sectors such as water supply and sanitation, the actual expenditure was 60% less than the amount budgeted, while in agriculture and allied activities only 53% of the budgeted amount was spent. CAG observed that in 251 schemes across 57 departments, the state government did not incur any expenditure in 2020-21. These schemes had a budget provision of at least one crore rupees, and had cumulative allocation of Rs 50,617 crore. These included schemes such as Pipe Drinking Water Scheme in Bundelkhand/Vindhya and apportionment of pension liabilities. Moreover, the overall savings due to non-utilisation of funds in 2020-21 was 27.28% of total budget provisions. CAG observed that the budgetary provisions increased between 2016 and 2021. However, the utilisation of budget provisions reduced between 2018-19 and 2020-21.
Pattern of spending: CAG observed that in case of 12 departments, more than 50% of the expenditure was incurred in March 2021, the last month of the financial year. In the civil aviation department, 89% of the total expenditure was incurred in March while this figure was 62% for the social welfare department (welfare of handicapped and backward classes). CAG noted that maintaining a steady pace of expenditure is a sound practice under public financial management. However, the Uttar Pradesh Budget Manual has no specific instructions for preventing such bunching of expenditure. The CAG recommended that the state government can consider issuing guidelines to control the rush of expenditure towards the closing months of the financial year.
Management of deficit and debt: As a measure to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, an Ordinance was promulgated in June 2020 to raise the fiscal deficit limit from 3% of GSDP to 5% of GSDP for the year 2020-21. Fiscal deficit represents the gap between expenditure and receipts in a year, and this gap is filled with borrowings. The Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2004 (FRBM Act) passed by Uttar Pradesh Assembly specifies the upper limit for debt and deficits. The Ordinance thus permitted the state government to borrow more to sustain its budget expenditure. The fiscal deficit of the state in 2020-21 was 3.20% of GSDP, well below the revised limit. At the same time, the state’s outstanding debt to GSDP in 2020-21 was 32.77% of GSDP, above the target of 32% of GSDP set under the FRBM Act. Outstanding debt represents accumulation of debt over the years.
Table 1: Spending by Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 as compared to Budget Estimates (in Rs crore)
|
Particular |
2020-21 BE |
2020-21 Actuals |
% change from BE to Actuals |
|
Net Receipts (1+2) |
4,24,767 |
2,97,311 |
-30% |
|
1. Revenue Receipts (a+b+c+d) |
4,22,567 |
2,96,176 |
-30% |
|
a. Own Tax Revenue |
1,58,413 |
1,19,897 |
-24% |
|
b. Own Non-Tax Revenue |
31,179 |
11,846 |
-62% |
|
c. Share in central taxes |
1,52,863 |
1,06,687 |
-30% |
|
d. Grants-in-aid from the Centre |
80,112 |
57,746 |
-28% |
|
Of which GST compensation grants |
7,608 |
9,381 |
23% |
|
2. Non-Debt Capital Receipts |
2,200 |
1,135 |
-48% |
|
3. Borrowings |
75,791 |
86,859 |
15% |
|
Of which GST compensation loan |
- |
6,007 |
- |
|
Net Expenditure (4+5+6) |
4,77,963 |
3,51,933 |
-26% |
|
4. Revenue Expenditure |
3,95,117 |
2,98,543 |
-24% |
|
5. Capital Outlay |
81,209 |
52,237 |
-36% |
|
6. Loans and Advances |
1,637 |
1,153 |
-30% |
|
7. Debt Repayment |
34,897 |
26,777 |
-23% |
|
Revenue Balance |
27,451 |
-2,367 |
-109% |
|
Revenue Balance (as % of GSDP) |
1.53% |
-0.14% |
|
|
Fiscal Deficit |
53,195 |
54,622 |
3% |
|
Fiscal Deficit (as % of GSDP) |
2.97% |
3.20% |
Note: A negative revenue balance indicates a deficit. The actual fiscal deficit reported by Uttar Pradesh for 2020-21 in 2022-23 budget was 2.8% of GSDP. This difference was due to higher GSDP figure reported by the state.
Sources: Uttar Pradesh Budget Documents of various years; CAG; PRS.
Finances of State Public Sector Undertakings
Public sector undertakings (PSUs) are set up by the government to discharge commercial activities in various sectors. As on March 31, 2021, there were 115 PSUs in Uttar Pradesh. CAG analysed the performance of 38 PSUs. Out of these 38 PSUs, 22 companies earned a profit of Rs 700 crore, while 16 companies posted a loss of Rs 7,411 crore in 2020-21. Note that both the number of PSUs incurring losses and the quantum of losses has decreased since 2018-19. In 2018-19, 20 PSUs had reported losses worth Rs 15,219 crore.
Figure 1: Cumulative losses incurred by Uttar Pradesh PSUs (Rs crore)
Sources: CAG; PRS.
Losses of power sector PSUs: Three power sector PSUs—Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, and Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited—were the top loss incurring PSUs. These three PSUs accounted for 73% of the total losses of Rs 7,411 crore mentioned above. Note that as of June 2022, for each unit of power supplied, the revenue realised by UP power distribution companies (discoms) is 27 paise less than cost of supply. This is better than the gap of 34 paise per unit at the national level. However, the aggregate technical and commercial losses (AT&C) of the Uttar Pradesh discoms was 27.85%, considerably higher than the national average of 17.19%. AT&C losses refer to the proportion of power supplied by a discom for which it does not receive any payment.
Off-budget borrowings: CAG also observed that the Uttar Pradesh government resorted to off-budget borrowing through state owned PSUs/authorities. Off budget borrowings are not accounted in the debt of the state government and are on books of the respective PSUs/authorities, although, debt is serviced by the state government. As a result, the outstanding debt reported in the budget does not represent the actual debt position of the state. CAG identified off-budget borrowing worth Rs 1,637 crore. The CAG recommended that the state government should avoid extra-budget borrowings. It should also credit all the loans taken by PSUs/authorities on behalf of and serviced by the state government to state government accounts.
Management of Reserve Funds
The Reserve Bank of India manages two reserve funds on the behalf of state governments. These funds are created to meet the liabilities of state governments. These funds are: (i) Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF), and (ii) Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF). They are funded by the contributions made by the state governments. CSF is an amortisation fund which is utilised to meet the repayment obligations of the government. Amortisation refers to payment of debt through regular instalments. The interest accumulated in the fund is used for repayment of outstanding liabilities (which is the accumulation of total borrowings at the end of a financial year, including any liabilities on the public account).
In line with the recommendation of the 12th Finance Commission, Uttar Pradesh created its CSF in March 2020. The state government may transfer at least 0.5% of its outstanding liabilities at the end of the previous year to the CSF. CAG observed that in 2020-21, Uttar Pradesh appropriated only Rs 1,000 crore to the CSF against the requirement of Rs 2,454 crore. CAG recommended that the state government should ensure at least 0.5% of the outstanding liabilities are contributed towards the CSF every year.
GRF is constituted by states to meet obligations related to guarantees. The state government may extend guarantee on loans taken by its PSUs. Guarantees are contingent liabilities of the state government, as in case of default by the company, repayment burden will fall on the state government. GRF can be used to settle guarantees extended by the government with respect to borrowings of state PSUs and other bodies. The 12th Finance Commission had recommended that states should constitute GRF. It was to be funded through guarantees fees to meet any sudden discharge of obligated guarantees extended by the states. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh government has not constituted GRF. Moreover, the state has also not fixed any limits for extending guarantees.
For an analysis of Uttar Pradesh’s 2022-23 budget, please see here.
