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Over the last few days, the retail prices of petrol and diesel have touched an all-time high.  In Delhi, petrol was selling at 74.6/litre on April 25, 2018, while diesel was at 66/litre.

Petroleum products are used as raw materials in various sectors and industries such as transport and petrochemicals.  These products may also be used in factories to operate machinery or generators.  Any fluctuation in the price of petrol and diesel impacts the production and transport costs of various items.  When compared to other neighbouring countries, India has the highest prices for petrol and diesel.

Note: Prices as on April 1, 2018. Prices for India pertain to Delhi. Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas; PRS.

Note: Prices as on April 1, 2018. Prices for India pertain to Delhi.
Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas; PRS.

How is the price of petrol and diesel fixed?

Historically, the price of petrol and diesel in India was regulated, i.e. the government was involved in the deciding the retail price.  The government deregulated the pricing of petrol in 2010 and diesel in 2014.  This allowed oil marketing companies to determine the price of these products, and revise them every fortnight.

Starting June 16, 2017, prices for petrol and diesel are revised on a daily basis.  This was done to with the idea that daily revision will reduce the volatility in retail prices, and protect the consumer against sharp fluctuations.  The break-up of retail prices of petrol and diesel in Delhi on April 25, 2018 can be found below.  As seen in the table, over 50% of the retail price of petrol comprises central and states taxes and the dealer’s commission.  In case of diesel, this amount is close to 40%.

Table 1: Break-up of petrol and diesel prices in Delhi (on April 25, 2018)

Component

Petrol

Diesel

Rs/litre % of retail price Rs/litre

% of retail price

Price Charged to Dealers 35.7 48% 38.4 58%
Excise Duty (levied by centre) 19.5 26% 15.3 23%
Dealer Commission 3.6 5% 2.5 4%
VAT (levied by state) 15.9 21% 9.7 15%
Retail Price 74.6 100% 65.9 100%
Source: Price Build-up of Petrol and Diesel at Delhi effective April 25, 2018; Indian Oil Corporation Limited.

 

Does India produce enough petroleum to support domestic consumption?

India imports 84% of the petroleum products consumed in the country.  This implies that any change in the global prices of crude oil has a significant impact on the domestic price of petroleum products.  In 2000-01, net import of petroleum products constituted 75% of the total consumption in the country.  This increased to 95% in 2016-17.  The figure below shows the amount of petroleum products consumed in the country, and the share of imports.

Note: Production is the difference between the total consumption in the country and the net imports. Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell; PRS.

Note: Production is the difference between the total consumption in the country and the net imports.
Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell; PRS.

What has been the global trend in crude oil prices? How has this impacted prices in India?

Over the last five years, the global price of crude oil (Indian basket) has come down from USD 110 in January 2013 to USD 64 in March 2018, having touched a low of USD 28 in January 2016.

While there has been a 42% drop in the price of global crude over this five-period, the retail price of petrol in India has increased by 8%.  During this period, the retail price of diesel increased by 33%.  The two figures below show the trend in prices of global crude oil and retail price of petrol and diesel in India, over the last five years.

Petrol price

Diesel price

 

Note: Subsidy indicated in the graphs is notional.  While calculating the subsidy amount, other factors such as cost of domestic inputs will also have to be accounted.  Global Crude Oil Price is for the Indian basket.  Figures reflect average monthly retail price of petrol and diesel in Delhi.
Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell; Indian Oil Corporation Limited; PRS.

 

How has the excise duty on petrol and diesel changed over the last few years?

Under the Constitution, the central government has the powers to tax the production of petroleum products, while states have the power to tax their sale.  Petroleum has been kept outside the purview of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), till the GST Council decides.

Over the years, the central government has used taxes to prevent sharp fluctuations in the retail price of diesel and petrol.  In the past, when global crude oil prices have increased, duties have been cut.  Since 2014, as global crude oil prices declined, excise duties have been increased.

Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell; PRS.

Sources: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell; PRS.

 

As a consequence of the increase in duties, the central government’s revenue from excise on petrol and diesel increased annually at a rate of 46% between 2013-14 and 2016-17.  During the same period, the total sales tax collections of states (from petrol and diesel) increased annually by 9%.  The figure below shows the trend in overall collections of the central and state governments from petroleum (including receipts from taxes, royalties, and dividends).

 

Notes: Data includes tax collections (from cesses, royalties, customs duty, central excise duty, state sales tax, octroi, and entry tax, among others), dividends paid to the government, and profit on oil exploration. Data sources: Petroleum and Planning Analysis Cell; Central Board of Excise and Customs; Indian Oil Corporation Limited; PRS.

Notes: Data includes tax collections (from cesses, royalties, customs duty, central excise duty, state sales tax, octroi, and entry tax, among others), dividends paid to the government, and profit on oil exploration.
Data sources: Petroleum and Planning Analysis Cell; Central Board of Excise and Customs; Indian Oil Corporation Limited; PRS.

Recently, the Karnataka legislature passed the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Bill, 2020.  BBMP is the municipal corporation of the Greater Bengaluru metropolitan area.  The BBMP Act, 2020 seeks to improve decentralisation, ensure public participation, and address certain administrative and structural concerns in Bengaluru.  In this blog, we discuss some common issues in urban local governance in India, in the context of Bengaluru’s municipal administration.

The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 provided for the establishment of urban local bodies (ULBs) (including municipal corporations) as institutions of local self-government.  It also empowered state governments to devolve certain functions, authority, and power to collect revenue to these bodies, and made periodic elections for them compulsory. 

Urban governance is part of the state list under the Constitution.  Thus, the administrative framework and regulation of ULBs varies across states.  However, experts have highlighted that ULBs across India face similar challenges.  For instance, ULBs across the country lack autonomy in city management and several city-level functions are managed by parastatals (managed by and accountable to the state).  Several taxation powers have also not been devolved to these bodies, leading to stressed municipal finances.  These challenges have led to poor service delivery in cities and also created administrative and governance challenges at the municipal level.

BBMP was established under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (KMC Act).  The BBMP Act, 2020 replaces provisions of the KMC Act, 1976 in its application to Bengaluru.  It adds a new level of zonal committees to the existing three-tier municipal structure in the city, and also gives the Corporation some more taxation powers.  Certain common issues in urban local governance in India, with provisions related to them in the BBMP Act, 2020 are given below.

Functional overlap with parastatals for key functions

The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 empowered states to devolve the responsibility of 18 functions including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, and slum upgradation to ULBs.  However, in most Indian cities including Bengaluru, a majority of these functions are carried out by parastatals.  For example, in Bengaluru, the Bengaluru Development Authority is responsible for land regulation and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board is responsible for slum rehabilitation. 

The BBMP Act, 2020 provides the Corporation with the power and responsibility to prepare and implement schemes for the 18 functions provided for in the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992.  However, it does not provide clarity if new bodies at the municipal level will be created, or the existing parastatals will continue to perform these functions and if so, whether their accountability will shift from the state to the municipal corporation. 

This could create a two-fold challenge in administration.  First, if there are multiple agencies performing similar functions, it could lead to a functional overlap, ambiguity, and wastage of resources.  Second, and more importantly, the presence of parastatals that are managed by and accountable to the state government leads to an erosion of the ULB’s autonomy.  Several experts have highlighted that this lack of autonomy faced by municipal corporations in most Indian cities leads to a challenge in governance, effective service delivery, and development of urban areas.

An Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) had recommended that activity mapping should be done for the 18 functions.  Under this, functions in the exclusive domain of municipalities and those which need to be shared with the state and the central government must be specified.  Experts have also recommended that the municipality should be responsible for providing civic amenities in its jurisdiction and if a parastatal exercises a civic function, it should be accountable to the municipality.

Stressed municipal finances

Indian ULBs are amongst the weakest in the world in terms of fiscal autonomy and have limited effective devolution of revenue.  They also have limited capacity to raise resources through their own sources of revenue such as property tax.  Municipal revenue in India accounts for only one percent of the GDP (2017-18).  This leads to a dependence on transfers by the state and central government.

ULBs in states like Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Haryana are in poor financial condition.  This has been attributed to limited powers to raise revenue and levy taxes, and problems in the management of existing resources.  For instance, the finances of Bihar’s ULBs were assessed to be poor because of: (i) delays in release of grants, (ii) inadequate devolution of funds, and (iii) delays in revision of tax rates and assessments of landholdings.

In comparison, Karnataka ranks high among Indian states in key indicators for fiscal capacity like collection of property taxes, grants from Central Finance Commissions, and state government transfers.  The BBMP Act, 2020 further increases the taxation powers of the Corporation, by allowing it to impose taxes on professions and entertainment.  

Experts have recommended that the central government and the respective state government should provide additional funds and facilitate additional funding mechanisms for ULBs to strengthen their finances.  The revenue of ULBs can be augmented through measures including assignment of greater powers of taxation to the ULBs by the state government, reforms in land and property-based taxes (such as the use of technology to cover more properties), and issuing of municipal bonds (debt instruments issued by ULBs to finance development projects). 

Powers of elected municipal officials

The executive power with state-appointed municipal Commissioners and elected municipal officers differs across states.  States like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, and cities like Chennai and Hyderabad vest the executive power in the Commissioner.  In contrast, the executive power of the Corporation is exercised by a Mayor-in council (consisting of the Mayor and up to 10 elected members of the Corporation) in Kolkata and Madhya Pradesh.  This is unlike large metropolitan cities in other countries like New York and London, where elected Mayors are designated as executive heads.  Experts have noted that charging Commissioners with executive power diluted the role of the Mayor and violated the spirit of self-governance.

Under the BBMP Act, 2020, both the elected Mayor and the state-appointed Chief Commissioner exercise several executive functions.  The Mayor is responsible for approving contracts and preparing the budget estimate for the Corporation.  He is also required to discharge all functions assigned to him by the Corporation.  On the other hand, executive functions of the Chief Commissioner include: (i) selling or leasing properties owned by the Corporation, and (ii) regulating and issuing instructions regarding public streets. 

The Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) has recommended that the Commissioner should act as a city manager and should be recruited through a transparent search-cum-selection process led by the Mayor.  A Model Municipal law, released by the Urban Development Ministry in 2003, provided that the executive power should be exercised by an Empowered Standing Committee consisting of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and seven elected councillors.  

Management of staff and human resources

Experts have noted that municipal administration in India suffers from staffing issues which leads to a failure in delivering basic urban services.  These include overstaffing of untrained manpower, shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors, and unwillingness to innovate in methods for service delivery. 

The BBMP Act, 2020 provides that the Corporation may make bye-laws for the due performance of duties by its employees.  However, it does not mention other aspects of human resource management such as recruitment and promotion.  A CAG report (2020) looking at the implementation of the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 in Karnataka has observed that the power to assess municipal staff requirements, recruiting such staff, and determining their pay, transfer and promotion vests with the state government.  This is in contrast with the recommendations of several experts who have suggested that municipalities should appoint their personnel to ensure accountability, adequate recruitment, and proper management of staff.

Other states including Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu also allow the state governments to regulate recruitment and staffing for ULBs.  In cities like Mumbai, and Coimbatore, and some states like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, while the recruitment process is conducted by the respective municipal corporations, the final sanction for hiring staff lies with the state government.