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Later this week, the GST Council will meet to discuss the issue of GST compensation to states. The central government is required to compensate states for any loss of revenue they incur due to GST. The Centre must pay this compensation on a bi-monthly basis, but over the past one year these payments have been delayed by several months due to lack of funds. The COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdown have amplified the issue manifold, with both centre and states facing a revenue shortfall, limiting the ability of the Centre to meet states’ compensation needs.
Why is the Centre required to compensate states for GST?
With GST implementation in 2017, the principle of indirect taxation for many goods and services changed from origin-based to destination-based. This means that the ability to tax goods and services and raise revenue shifted from origin states (where the good or service is produced) to destination states (where it is consumed). This change posed a risk of revenue uncertainty for some states. This concern of states was addressed through constitutional amendments, requiring Parliament to make a law to provide for compensation to states for five years to avoid any revenue loss due to GST.
For this purpose, the GST (Compensation to States) Act was enacted in 2017 on the recommendation of the GST Council. The Act guarantees all states an annual growth rate of 14% in their GST revenue during the period July 2017-June 2022. If a state’s GST revenue grows slower than 14%, such ‘loss of revenue’ will be taken care of by the Centre by providing GST compensation grants to the state. To provide these grants, the Centre levies a GST compensation cess on certain luxury and sin goods such as cigarettes and tobacco products, pan masala, caffeinated beverages, coal, and certain passenger vehicles. The Act requires the Centre to credit this cess revenue into a separate Compensation Fund and all compensation grants to states are required to be paid out of the money available in this Fund.
How much compensation is provided to states?
For 2018-19, Centre gave Rs 81,141 crore to states as GST compensation. However, for the year 2019-20, the compensation requirement of states nearly doubled to Rs 1.65 lakh crore. A huge increase in requirement implies that states’ GST revenue grew at a slower rate during 2019-20. This can be attributed to the economic slowdown seen last year, which resulted in a nominal GDP growth of 7.2%. This was significantly lower than the 12% GDP growth forecast in the 2019-20 union budget (Figure 1).
Figure 1: GDP growth rate (2017-21)
Sources: Union Budget Documents; MOSPI; PRS.
In 2019-20, the gross GST revenue (Centre+states) increased by just 4% over the previous year. Despite this, due to the compensation guarantee, all states could achieve the growth rate of 14% in their GST revenue – much higher than the overall growth in GST revenue. However, there was a delay in payment of compensation from Centre. More than Rs 64,000 crore of the compensation requirement of states for 2019-20 was met in the financial year 2020-21.
What led to a delay in payment of compensation to states?
In 2019-20, the delay in payment was observed due to insufficient funds with Centre for providing compensation to states. These funds are raised by levying a compensation cess on the sale of certain goods, some of which were affected by the economic slowdown. For instance, in 2019-20, sales of passenger vehicles declined by almost 18% and coal offtake from domestic coal companies reduced by nearly 5%, over the previous year. As a result, cess collections registered a growth of just 0.4% in 2019-20 (Figure 2), against the 104% increase seen in the compensation requirement of states. This resulted in a shortfall of funds of nearly Rs 70,000 crore.
Figure 2: Cess collections insufficient for providing compensation
Note: In 2017-18, GST was implemented for only nine months. Compensation amount shown may not match with the amount released in that financial year because of delay in releases.
Sources: Union Budget Documents; Ministry of Finance; GST Council; Lok Sabha Questions; PRS.
How can compensation be paid to states if cess collections are insufficient?
The shortfall in collections for 2019-20 was met through: (i) surplus cess collections from previous years, (ii) partial cess collections of 2020-21, and (iii) a transfer of Rs 33,412 crore of unsettled GST funds from the Centre to the Compensation Fund. These unsettled funds are GST collections, generated in 2017-18 from inter-state and foreign trade, that have not yet been settled between centre and states.
In the 2020-21 budget, the Centre has estimated a 10% growth in nominal GDP. However, due to the impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown, the actual growth in 2020-21 is likely to be much lower. In such a scenario, states’ GST revenue would also be much lower than expected, thus leading to a higher compensation requirement. However, the ability of Centre to pay compensation depends on the cess collections, which are also getting impacted this year. For instance, cess collections during the period Apr-Jun 2020 have been 41% lower in comparison to the same period last year. Moreover, of the Rs 14,482 crore collections made during this period, Rs 8,680 crore has been likely used up for paying compensation for 2019-20.
Note that under the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, Centre can provide compensation to states only through the money available in the Compensation Fund. The Union Finance Minister, in her budget speech in February 2020, clarified that transfers to the Fund would be limited only to collections of the GST compensation cess. Despite a shortfall of money in the Compensation Fund, the Centre is constitutionally obligated to meet states’ compensation requirement for a period of five years.
Various measures have been suggested to address the issue of shortfall in the Fund, either by reducing the compensation payable to states (which would require Parliament to amend the Act following GST Council’s recommendation) or by supplementing the funds available with Centre for providing compensation to states. The Act allows the GST Council to recommend other funding mechanisms/ amounts for credit into the Compensation Fund. For example, one of the measures proposed for meeting the shortfall involves Centre using market borrowings to pay compensation to states, with the idea that these borrowings will be repaid with the help of future cess collections. To enable this, the GST Council may recommend to Centre that the compensation cess be levied for a period beyond five years, i.e. post June 2022.
Impact on states post 2022
In 2019-20, except for a few north-eastern states, most states saw their compensation requirements increase multifold by 2-3 times, over the previous year’s figures. Table 1 shows the compensation requirement of states for the years 2018-19 and 2019-20. Six states (Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu) accounted for 52% of the total requirement of compensation for 2019-20. Further, in some states such as Punjab and Delhi, compensation grants form a significant share of the overall revenue receipts (20% and 16% resepctively).
Note that states have been guaranteed compensation only for a period of five years. After June 2022, states dependent on compensation will observe a revenue gap due to a cut in these grants coming from Centre. States have roughly two years to bridge this gap with other tax and non-tax sources to avoid a potential loss of revenue, and a consequent fall in the size of their state budget, which could adversely affect the economy. To what extent will such concerns be alleviated remains to be seen based on the course of action decided by the GST Council.
Table 1: GST compensation requirement of states for 2018-19 and 2019-20 (in Rs crore)
|
State |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
% increase in compensation requirement |
||
|
Amount |
As a % of revenue |
Amount |
As a % of revenue* |
||
|
Andhra Pradesh |
0 |
- |
3,028 |
3% |
- |
|
Assam |
455 |
1% |
1,284 |
1% |
182% |
|
Bihar |
2,798 |
2% |
5,464 |
4% |
95% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
2,592 |
4% |
4,521 |
7% |
74% |
|
Delhi |
5,185 |
12% |
8,424 |
16% |
62% |
|
Goa |
502 |
5% |
1,093 |
9% |
118% |
|
Gujarat |
7,227 |
5% |
14,801 |
10% |
105% |
|
Haryana |
3,916 |
6% |
6,617 |
10% |
69% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
1,935 |
6% |
2,477 |
8% |
28% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
1,667 |
3% |
3,281 |
5% |
97% |
|
Jharkhand |
1,098 |
2% |
2,219 |
4% |
102% |
|
Karnataka |
12,465 |
8% |
18,628 |
11% |
49% |
|
Kerala |
3,532 |
4% |
8,111 |
9% |
130% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
3,302 |
3% |
6,538 |
4% |
98% |
|
Maharashtra |
9,363 |
3% |
19,233 |
7% |
105% |
|
Meghalaya |
66 |
1% |
157 |
2% |
138% |
|
Odisha |
3,785 |
4% |
5,122 |
5% |
35% |
|
Punjab |
8,239 |
13% |
12,187 |
20% |
48% |
|
Rajasthan |
2,280 |
2% |
6,710 |
5% |
194% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
4,824 |
3% |
12,305 |
7% |
155% |
|
Telangana |
0 |
- |
3,054 |
3% |
- |
|
Tripura |
172 |
1% |
293 |
3% |
70% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
0 |
- |
9,123 |
3% |
- |
|
Uttarakhand |
2,442 |
8% |
3,375 |
11% |
38% |
|
West Bengal |
2,615 |
2% |
6,200 |
4% |
137% |
Note: Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim did not require any compensation in 2018-19 and 2019-20.
*Revenue for the year 2019-20 does not takes into account those GST compensation grants which were payable to states in 2019-20 but were released by Centre in the year 2020-21. The percentage figures would be slightly lower if such grants are included in 2019-20 revenue.
Sources: State Budget Documents; Ministry of Finance; Lok Sabha Questions; CAG; PRS.
Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23. This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand. This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.
Overview of financial losses
For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses. Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees. In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues. State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power. These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt. In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore. This increase has been driven by rising costs. At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).
Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies
|
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
|
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
|
Per unit loss (ACS-ARR) |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
|
Total losses (in Rs crore) |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity. The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.
Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand
In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22. Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%. Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers. These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.
Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.
Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand. The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year. It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units. However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).
To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up. Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22. To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal. The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.
Sources: Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.
Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23. While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector. In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne. This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase. Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.
Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.
Coal import situation going forward
In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023. It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%. This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24. Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.
Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.
Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances
Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues. Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos). Power purchase costs in these contracts do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged. Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks. As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years. In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost. This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments. However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt. In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.
Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased. In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22. Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore. Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.
Risk to state finances
Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances. These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.
Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2). As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP. Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP). Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.
Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years
|
Year |
Scheme |
Details |
|
2002 |
Bailout Package |
States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs |
|
2012 |
Financial Restructuring Package |
States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore |
|
2015 |
Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) |
States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses |
|
2020 |
Liquidity Infusion Scheme |
Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee |
|
2022 |
Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme |
Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure |
Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.
For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here. For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.
ANNEXURE
Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)
|
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
|
of which |
||||
|
Cost of procuring power |
5.8 |
5.9 |
5.8 |
6.6 |
|
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
|
of which |
||||
|
Revenue from sale of power |
5.0 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
5.5 |
|
Tariff subsidy |
1.3 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.5 |
|
Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY |
0.3 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
0.2 |
|
Per unit loss |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
|
Total financial losses |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)
|
State/UT |
2017-18 |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Andaman and Nicobar Islands |
-605 |
-645 |
-678 |
-757 |
-86 |
-76 |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
-546 |
-16,831 |
1,103 |
-6,894 |
-2,595 |
1,211 |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
-429 |
-420 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Assam |
-259 |
311 |
1,141 |
-107 |
357 |
-800 |
|
Bihar |
-1,872 |
-1,845 |
-2,913 |
-2,966 |
-2,546 |
-10 |
|
Chandigarh |
321 |
131 |
59 |
79 |
-101 |
NA |
|
Chhattisgarh |
-739 |
-814 |
-571 |
-713 |
-807 |
-1,015 |
|
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
312 |
-149 |
-125 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Delhi |
NA |
NA |
NA |
98 |
57 |
-141 |
|
Goa |
26 |
-121 |
-276 |
78 |
117 |
69 |
|
Gujarat |
426 |
184 |
314 |
429 |
371 |
147 |
|
Haryana |
412 |
281 |
331 |
637 |
849 |
975 |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
-44 |
132 |
43 |
-153 |
-141 |
-1,340 |
|
Jharkhand |
-212 |
-730 |
-1,111 |
-2,556 |
-1,721 |
-3,545 |
|
Karnataka |
-2,439 |
-4,889 |
-2,501 |
-5,382 |
4,719 |
-2,414 |
|
Kerala |
-784 |
-135 |
-270 |
-483 |
98 |
-1,022 |
|
Ladakh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
-11 |
-57 |
|
Lakshadweep |
-98 |
-120 |
-115 |
-117 |
NA |
NA |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
-5,802 |
-9,713 |
-5,034 |
-9,884 |
-2,354 |
1,842 |
|
Maharashtra |
-3,927 |
2,549 |
-5,011 |
-7,129 |
-1,147 |
-19,846 |
|
Manipur |
-8 |
-42 |
-15 |
-15 |
-22 |
-146 |
|
Meghalaya |
-287 |
-202 |
-443 |
-101 |
-157 |
-193 |
|
Mizoram |
87 |
-260 |
-291 |
-115 |
-59 |
-158 |
|
Nagaland |
-62 |
-94 |
-477 |
-17 |
24 |
33 |
|
Puducherry |
5 |
-39 |
-306 |
-23 |
84 |
-131 |
|
Punjab |
-2,760 |
363 |
-975 |
49 |
1,680 |
-1,375 |
|
Rajasthan |
-11,314 |
-12,524 |
-12,277 |
-5,994 |
2,374 |
-2,024 |
|
Sikkim |
-29 |
-3 |
-179 |
-34 |
NA |
71 |
|
Tamil Nadu |
-12,541 |
-17,186 |
-16,528 |
-13,066 |
-9,130 |
-9,192 |
|
Telangana |
-6,697 |
-9,525 |
-6,966 |
-6,686 |
-831 |
-11,103 |
|
Tripura |
28 |
38 |
-104 |
-4 |
-127 |
-193 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
-5,269 |
-5,902 |
-3,866 |
-10,660 |
-6,498 |
-15,512 |
|
Uttarakhand |
-229 |
-808 |
-323 |
-152 |
-21 |
-1,224 |
|
West Bengal |
-871 |
-1,171 |
-1,867 |
-4,261 |
1,045 |
-1,663 |
|
State Sector |
-56,206 |
-80,179 |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
|
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
NA |
NA |
NA |
242 |
148 |
104 |
|
Delhi |
109 |
657 |
-975 |
1,876 |
521 |
-76 |
|
Gujarat |
574 |
307 |
612 |
655 |
522 |
627 |
|
Odisha |
NA |
NA |
-842 |
-853 |
940 |
746 |
|
Maharashtra |
NA |
590 |
1,696 |
-375 |
360 |
42 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
182 |
126 |
172 |
333 |
256 |
212 |
|
West Bengal |
658 |
377 |
379 |
398 |
66 |
-12 |
|
Private Sector |
1,523 |
2,057 |
1,042 |
2,276 |
2,813 |
1,643 |
|
All-India |
-54,683 |
-78,122 |
-59,189 |
-77,896 |
-13,766 |
-67,189 |
Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
