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‘Ease of doing business’ refers to the regulatory environment in a country to set up and operate a business. Every year, the World Bank compares the business environment in 190 countries in its Ease of Doing Business Report. In its report released yesterday, India’s rank improved to 100 out of 190 countries in 2017, from its rank of 130 in the previous year.[1],[2] In this context, we explain the parameters on which each country is ranked, what has led to India’s improvement in rankings, and some recommendations made by committees to further improve the business environment in the country.
What parameters is a country ranked on?
The ease of doing business rankings are based on a country’s performance on 10 parameters such as enforcing contracts and starting a business. In India, these rankings are based on the business environment in Mumbai and Delhi. A lower rank indicates better performance on that parameter, whereas a higher rank indicates worse performance on the indicator. India’s ranking improved in six out of the 10 parameters over the previous year, while it remained the same or fell in the remaining four (see Table 1).
Note that these parameters are regulated by different agencies across the three tiers of government (i.e. central, state and municipal). For example, for starting a business, registration and other clearances are granted by central ministries such as Finance and Corporate Affairs. Electricity and water connections for a business are granted by the state electricity and water boards. The municipal corporations grant building permits and various other no objection certificates to businesses.
What has led to an improvement in India’s ease of doing business rankings?
According to the 2017 report, India introduced changes in some of these parameters, which helped in improving its ranking.1 Some of these changes include:
What are some of the other recommendations to improve the business environment in India?
Over the last few years various committees, such as an Expert Committee constituted by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion and the Standing Committee of Commerce, have studied the the regulatory requirements for starting a business in India and the made recommendations on the ease of doing business.[7],[8],[9] Some of the issues and recommendations made by these committees are discussed below.
Starting a business: The Standing Committee observed that regulations and procedures for starting a business are time-consuming.8 The Committee observed that as a consequence, a large number of start-ups are moving out of India and setting base in countries like Singapore where such procedures are easier. It emphasised on the need to streamline regulations to give businesses in India a boost. Note that the government announced the ‘Start-up India Action Plan in January 2016.[10] The 19-point plan identified steps to simplify the process for registering and operating start-ups. It also proposed to grant tax exemptions to these businesses.
The Committee had suggested that the procedures and time period for registration of companies should be reduced. In addition, a unique business ID should be created to integrate all information related to a debtor. This ID should be used as sole reference for the business.
Acquiring land, registering property: Under the current legal framework there are delays in acquiring land and getting necessary permissions to use it. These delays are on account of multiple reasons including the availability of suitable land and disputes related to land titles. It has been noted that land titles in India are unclear due to various reasons including legacy of the zamindari system, gaps in the legal framework and poor administration of land records.[11]
The Standing Committee observed that the process of updating and digitising land records has been going on for three decades. It recommended that this process should be completed at the earliest. The digitised records would assist in removing ambiguity in land titles and help in its smooth transfer. It also suggested that land ownership may be ascertained by integrating space technology and identification documents such as Aadhaar. Note that as of September 2017, land records had been linked with Aadhaar in 4% of the villages across the country.[11]
Several states have taken steps to improve regulations related to land and transfer of property.8 These steps include integration of land records and land registration by Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, and the passage of a law to certify land titles in urban areas by Rajasthan. The Committee also recommended creating a single window for registration of property, to reduce delays.8
Construction permits: In India, obtaining construction permits involves multiple procedures and is time consuming. The Standing Committee had observed that it took 33 procedures (such as getting no objection certificates from individual departments) over 192 days to obtain a construction permit in India.8 On the other hand, obtaining a similar permit in Singapore involved 10 procedures and took 26 days.
Taxation: The Standing Committee had noted that the tax administration in India was complex, and arbitration proceedings were time-consuming. It observed that the controversies on the Minimum Alternate Tax on capital gains and the tax disputes with companies like Vodafone and Shell had harmed India’s image on taxation matters. Such policy uncertainty and tax disputes have made foreign companies hesitant to do business in India.8
The Committee observed that for ‘Make in India’ to succeed, there is a need for a fair, judicious and stable tax administration in the country. Further, it suggested that to reduce harassment of tax payers, an electronic tax administration system should be created.8 Such a system would reduce human interface during dispute resolution. Note that the Goods and Services Tax (GST) was introduced across the country from July 1, 2017. The GST framework allows for electronic filling of tax returns, among other measures.[12]
Enforcing contracts: Enforcing contracts requires the involvement of the judicial system. The time taken to enforce contracts in India is long. For instance, the Standing Committee noted that it took close to four years in India for enforcing contracts. On the other hand, it took less than six months for contract enforcement in Singapore. This may be due to various reasons including complex litigation procedures, confusion related to jurisdiction of courts and high existing pendency of cases.8
The Standing Committee recommended that an alternative dispute resolution mechanism and fast track courts should be set up to expedite disposal of contract enforcement cases. It suggested that efforts should be made to limit adjournments to exceptional circumstances only. It also recommended that certified practitioners should be created, to assist dispute resolution.8
[1] ‘Doing Business 2018’, World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf.
[2] ‘Doing Business 2017’, World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Full-Report.pdf.
[3] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-bill-2015-4100/.
[4] G.S.R. 436 (E), G.S.R. 437 (E) and G.S.R. 438 (E), Gazette of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment, May 4, 2017, http://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/Notifications%20for%20amendment%20under%20EPF%2C%20EPS%20and%20EDLI%20Schemes%20for%20e-Payment_0.pdf.
[5] Finance Bill, 2017, http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-finance-bill-2017-4681/; Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2017, http://unionbudget.nic.in/ub2017-18/memo/memo.pdf.
[6] National Judicial Data Grid, http://njdg.ecourts.gov.in/njdg_public/index.php.
[7] Report of the Expert Committee on Prior Permissions and Regulatory Mechanism, Department of Industrial Policy Promotion, February 27, 2016.
[8] ‘Ease of Doing Business’, 122nd Report of the Department Related Standing Committee on Commerce, December 21, 2015, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Commerce/122.pdf.
[9] Ease of Doing Business: An Enterprise of Survey of Indian States, NITI Aayog, August 28, 2017, http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/EoDB_Single.pdf.
[10] Start Up India Action Plan, January 2016, http://www.startupindia.gov.in/pdffile.php?title=Startup%20India%20Action%20Plan&type=Action&q=Action%20Plan.pdf&content_type=Action&submenupoint=action.
[11] Land Records and Titles in India, September 2017, http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/analytical-reports/land-records-and-titles-in-india-4941/.
[12] The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-central-goods-and-services-tax-bill-2017-4697/.
Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23. This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand. This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.
Overview of financial losses
For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses. Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees. In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues. State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power. These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt. In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore. This increase has been driven by rising costs. At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).
Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
Per unit loss (ACS-ARR) |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
Total losses (in Rs crore) |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity. The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.
Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand
In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22. Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%. Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers. These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.
Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.
Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand. The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year. It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units. However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).
To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up. Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22. To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal. The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.
Sources: Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.
Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23. While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector. In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne. This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase. Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.
Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.
Coal import situation going forward
In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023. It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%. This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24. Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.
Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.
Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances
Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues. Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos). Power purchase costs in these contracts do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged. Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks. As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years. In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost. This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments. However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt. In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.
Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased. In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22. Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore. Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.
Risk to state finances
Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances. These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.
Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2). As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP. Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP). Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.
Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years
Year |
Scheme |
Details |
2002 |
Bailout Package |
States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs |
2012 |
Financial Restructuring Package |
States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore |
2015 |
Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) |
States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses |
2020 |
Liquidity Infusion Scheme |
Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee |
2022 |
Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme |
Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure |
Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.
For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here. For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.
ANNEXURE
Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
of which |
||||
Cost of procuring power |
5.8 |
5.9 |
5.8 |
6.6 |
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
of which |
||||
Revenue from sale of power |
5.0 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
5.5 |
Tariff subsidy |
1.3 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.5 |
Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY |
0.3 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
0.2 |
Per unit loss |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
Total financial losses |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)
State/UT |
2017-18 |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
Andaman and Nicobar Islands |
-605 |
-645 |
-678 |
-757 |
-86 |
-76 |
Andhra Pradesh |
-546 |
-16,831 |
1,103 |
-6,894 |
-2,595 |
1,211 |
Arunachal Pradesh |
-429 |
-420 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Assam |
-259 |
311 |
1,141 |
-107 |
357 |
-800 |
Bihar |
-1,872 |
-1,845 |
-2,913 |
-2,966 |
-2,546 |
-10 |
Chandigarh |
321 |
131 |
59 |
79 |
-101 |
NA |
Chhattisgarh |
-739 |
-814 |
-571 |
-713 |
-807 |
-1,015 |
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
312 |
-149 |
-125 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Delhi |
NA |
NA |
NA |
98 |
57 |
-141 |
Goa |
26 |
-121 |
-276 |
78 |
117 |
69 |
Gujarat |
426 |
184 |
314 |
429 |
371 |
147 |
Haryana |
412 |
281 |
331 |
637 |
849 |
975 |
Himachal Pradesh |
-44 |
132 |
43 |
-153 |
-141 |
-1,340 |
Jharkhand |
-212 |
-730 |
-1,111 |
-2,556 |
-1,721 |
-3,545 |
Karnataka |
-2,439 |
-4,889 |
-2,501 |
-5,382 |
4,719 |
-2,414 |
Kerala |
-784 |
-135 |
-270 |
-483 |
98 |
-1,022 |
Ladakh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
-11 |
-57 |
Lakshadweep |
-98 |
-120 |
-115 |
-117 |
NA |
NA |
Madhya Pradesh |
-5,802 |
-9,713 |
-5,034 |
-9,884 |
-2,354 |
1,842 |
Maharashtra |
-3,927 |
2,549 |
-5,011 |
-7,129 |
-1,147 |
-19,846 |
Manipur |
-8 |
-42 |
-15 |
-15 |
-22 |
-146 |
Meghalaya |
-287 |
-202 |
-443 |
-101 |
-157 |
-193 |
Mizoram |
87 |
-260 |
-291 |
-115 |
-59 |
-158 |
Nagaland |
-62 |
-94 |
-477 |
-17 |
24 |
33 |
Puducherry |
5 |
-39 |
-306 |
-23 |
84 |
-131 |
Punjab |
-2,760 |
363 |
-975 |
49 |
1,680 |
-1,375 |
Rajasthan |
-11,314 |
-12,524 |
-12,277 |
-5,994 |
2,374 |
-2,024 |
Sikkim |
-29 |
-3 |
-179 |
-34 |
NA |
71 |
Tamil Nadu |
-12,541 |
-17,186 |
-16,528 |
-13,066 |
-9,130 |
-9,192 |
Telangana |
-6,697 |
-9,525 |
-6,966 |
-6,686 |
-831 |
-11,103 |
Tripura |
28 |
38 |
-104 |
-4 |
-127 |
-193 |
Uttar Pradesh |
-5,269 |
-5,902 |
-3,866 |
-10,660 |
-6,498 |
-15,512 |
Uttarakhand |
-229 |
-808 |
-323 |
-152 |
-21 |
-1,224 |
West Bengal |
-871 |
-1,171 |
-1,867 |
-4,261 |
1,045 |
-1,663 |
State Sector |
-56,206 |
-80,179 |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
NA |
NA |
NA |
242 |
148 |
104 |
Delhi |
109 |
657 |
-975 |
1,876 |
521 |
-76 |
Gujarat |
574 |
307 |
612 |
655 |
522 |
627 |
Odisha |
NA |
NA |
-842 |
-853 |
940 |
746 |
Maharashtra |
NA |
590 |
1,696 |
-375 |
360 |
42 |
Uttar Pradesh |
182 |
126 |
172 |
333 |
256 |
212 |
West Bengal |
658 |
377 |
379 |
398 |
66 |
-12 |
Private Sector |
1,523 |
2,057 |
1,042 |
2,276 |
2,813 |
1,643 |
All-India |
-54,683 |
-78,122 |
-59,189 |
-77,896 |
-13,766 |
-67,189 |
Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.