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Following the recommendation of the Election Commission (EC), the President disqualified 20 MLAs of the Delhi Legislative Assembly last month for holding an ‘office of profit’. The legislators in question were appointed as parliamentary secretaries to various ministries in the Delhi government. The Delhi High Court is currently hearing a petition filed by the disqualified MLAs against the EC’s recommendation. There have been reports of parliamentary secretaries being appointed in 20 states in the past with court judgments striking down these appointments in several cases. In this context, we discuss the law on holding an ‘office of profit’.
What is the concept of ‘office of profit’?
MPs and MLAs, as members of the legislature, hold the government accountable for its work. The essence of disqualification under the office of profit law is if legislators holds an ‘office of profit’ under the government, they might be susceptible to government influence, and may not discharge their constitutional mandate fairly. The intent is that there should be no conflict between the duties and interests of an elected member. Hence, the office of profit law simply seeks to enforce a basic feature of the Constitution- the principle of separation of power between the legislature and the executive.
According to the definition, what constitutes an ‘office of profit’?
The law does not clearly define what constitutes an office of profit but the definition has evolved over the years with interpretations made in various court judgments. An office of profit has been interpreted to be a position that brings to the office-holder some financial gain, or advantage, or benefit. The amount of such profit is immaterial.
In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that the test for determining whether a person holds an office of profit is the test of appointment. Several factors are considered in this determination including factors such as: (i) whether the government is the appointing authority, (ii) whether the government has the power to terminate the appointment, (iii) whether the government determines the remuneration, (iv) what is the source of remuneration, and (v) the power that comes with the position.
What does the Constitution say about holding an ‘office of profit’? Can exemptions be granted under the law?
Under the provisions of Article 102 (1) and Article 191 (1) of the Constitution, an MP or an MLA (or an MLC) is barred from holding any office of profit under the central or state government. The articles clarify that “a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the government of India or the government of any state by reason only that he is a minister”. The Constitution specifies that the number of ministers including the Chief Minister has to be within 15% of the total number of members of the assembly (10% in the case of Delhi, which is a union territory with legislature).
Provisions of Articles 102 and 191 also protect a legislator occupying a government position if the office in question has been made immune to disqualification by law. In the recent past, several state legislatures have enacted laws exempting certain offices from the purview of office of profit. Parliament has also enacted the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, which has been amended several times to expand the exempted list.
Is there a bar on how many offices can be exempted from the purview of the law?
There is no bar on how many offices can be exempted from the purview of the law.
It was reported in 2015 that all 60 MLAs of the Nagaland Assembly had joined the ruling alliance. The Nagaland Chief Minister appointed 26 legislators as parliamentary secretaries in July 2017. Goa, an assembly of 40 MLAs, exempted more than 50 offices by means of an ordinance issued in June last year. Puducherry, an assembly of 33 MLAs, exempted more than 60 offices by passing an amendment bill in 2009. In Delhi, the 21 parliamentary secretaries added to the seven ministerial posts would constitute 40% of the 70-member legislature. In all, 20 states have similar provisions.
This raises an important concern. If a large number of legislators are appointed to such offices, their role in scrutinising the work of the government may be impaired. Thus, this could contravene the spirit of Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution.
What is the debate around making appointments to the office of parliamentary secretaries?
Interestingly, the appointment of legislators as parliamentary secretaries, in spite of the office being exempted from purview of the office of profit law, has been struck down by courts in several states.
Why has the appointment as a parliamentary secretary been struck down while other offices are allowed to be exempt from the purview of the law? If legislators can be accommodated in positions other than ‘parliamentary secretary’, why do state governments continue to appoint legislators as parliamentary secretaries instead of appointing them to other offices?
These questions have been answered in a Calcutta High Court judgment in 2015 which held that since the position may confer the rank of a junior minister on the legislator, the appointment of MLAs as parliamentary secretaries was an attempt by state governments to bypass the constitutional ceiling on the number of ministers. In 2009, the Bombay High Court also held that appointing parliamentary secretaries of the rank and status of a Cabinet Minister is in violation of Article 164 (1A) of the Constitution. The Article specifies that the number of ministers including the Chief Minister should not exceed 15% of the total number of members in the assembly.
Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23. This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand. This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.
Overview of financial losses
For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses. Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees. In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues. State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power. These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt. In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore. This increase has been driven by rising costs. At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).
Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies
|
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
|
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
|
Per unit loss (ACS-ARR) |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
|
Total losses (in Rs crore) |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity. The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.
Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand
In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22. Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%. Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers. These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.
Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.
Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand. The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year. It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units. However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).
To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up. Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22. To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal. The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.
Sources: Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.
Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23. While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector. In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne. This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase. Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.
Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.
Coal import situation going forward
In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023. It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%. This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24. Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.
Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.
Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances
Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues. Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos). Power purchase costs in these contracts do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged. Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks. As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years. In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost. This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments. However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt. In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.
Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased. In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22. Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore. Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.
Risk to state finances
Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances. These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.
Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2). As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP. Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP). Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.
Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years
|
Year |
Scheme |
Details |
|
2002 |
Bailout Package |
States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs |
|
2012 |
Financial Restructuring Package |
States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore |
|
2015 |
Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) |
States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses |
|
2020 |
Liquidity Infusion Scheme |
Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee |
|
2022 |
Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme |
Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure |
Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.
For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here. For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.
ANNEXURE
Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)
|
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
|
of which |
||||
|
Cost of procuring power |
5.8 |
5.9 |
5.8 |
6.6 |
|
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
|
of which |
||||
|
Revenue from sale of power |
5.0 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
5.5 |
|
Tariff subsidy |
1.3 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.5 |
|
Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY |
0.3 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
0.2 |
|
Per unit loss |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
|
Total financial losses |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)
|
State/UT |
2017-18 |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Andaman and Nicobar Islands |
-605 |
-645 |
-678 |
-757 |
-86 |
-76 |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
-546 |
-16,831 |
1,103 |
-6,894 |
-2,595 |
1,211 |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
-429 |
-420 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Assam |
-259 |
311 |
1,141 |
-107 |
357 |
-800 |
|
Bihar |
-1,872 |
-1,845 |
-2,913 |
-2,966 |
-2,546 |
-10 |
|
Chandigarh |
321 |
131 |
59 |
79 |
-101 |
NA |
|
Chhattisgarh |
-739 |
-814 |
-571 |
-713 |
-807 |
-1,015 |
|
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
312 |
-149 |
-125 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Delhi |
NA |
NA |
NA |
98 |
57 |
-141 |
|
Goa |
26 |
-121 |
-276 |
78 |
117 |
69 |
|
Gujarat |
426 |
184 |
314 |
429 |
371 |
147 |
|
Haryana |
412 |
281 |
331 |
637 |
849 |
975 |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
-44 |
132 |
43 |
-153 |
-141 |
-1,340 |
|
Jharkhand |
-212 |
-730 |
-1,111 |
-2,556 |
-1,721 |
-3,545 |
|
Karnataka |
-2,439 |
-4,889 |
-2,501 |
-5,382 |
4,719 |
-2,414 |
|
Kerala |
-784 |
-135 |
-270 |
-483 |
98 |
-1,022 |
|
Ladakh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
-11 |
-57 |
|
Lakshadweep |
-98 |
-120 |
-115 |
-117 |
NA |
NA |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
-5,802 |
-9,713 |
-5,034 |
-9,884 |
-2,354 |
1,842 |
|
Maharashtra |
-3,927 |
2,549 |
-5,011 |
-7,129 |
-1,147 |
-19,846 |
|
Manipur |
-8 |
-42 |
-15 |
-15 |
-22 |
-146 |
|
Meghalaya |
-287 |
-202 |
-443 |
-101 |
-157 |
-193 |
|
Mizoram |
87 |
-260 |
-291 |
-115 |
-59 |
-158 |
|
Nagaland |
-62 |
-94 |
-477 |
-17 |
24 |
33 |
|
Puducherry |
5 |
-39 |
-306 |
-23 |
84 |
-131 |
|
Punjab |
-2,760 |
363 |
-975 |
49 |
1,680 |
-1,375 |
|
Rajasthan |
-11,314 |
-12,524 |
-12,277 |
-5,994 |
2,374 |
-2,024 |
|
Sikkim |
-29 |
-3 |
-179 |
-34 |
NA |
71 |
|
Tamil Nadu |
-12,541 |
-17,186 |
-16,528 |
-13,066 |
-9,130 |
-9,192 |
|
Telangana |
-6,697 |
-9,525 |
-6,966 |
-6,686 |
-831 |
-11,103 |
|
Tripura |
28 |
38 |
-104 |
-4 |
-127 |
-193 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
-5,269 |
-5,902 |
-3,866 |
-10,660 |
-6,498 |
-15,512 |
|
Uttarakhand |
-229 |
-808 |
-323 |
-152 |
-21 |
-1,224 |
|
West Bengal |
-871 |
-1,171 |
-1,867 |
-4,261 |
1,045 |
-1,663 |
|
State Sector |
-56,206 |
-80,179 |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
|
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
NA |
NA |
NA |
242 |
148 |
104 |
|
Delhi |
109 |
657 |
-975 |
1,876 |
521 |
-76 |
|
Gujarat |
574 |
307 |
612 |
655 |
522 |
627 |
|
Odisha |
NA |
NA |
-842 |
-853 |
940 |
746 |
|
Maharashtra |
NA |
590 |
1,696 |
-375 |
360 |
42 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
182 |
126 |
172 |
333 |
256 |
212 |
|
West Bengal |
658 |
377 |
379 |
398 |
66 |
-12 |
|
Private Sector |
1,523 |
2,057 |
1,042 |
2,276 |
2,813 |
1,643 |
|
All-India |
-54,683 |
-78,122 |
-59,189 |
-77,896 |
-13,766 |
-67,189 |
Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
