The Finance Bill, 2017 is being discussed in Lok Sabha today. Generally, the Finance Bill is passed as a Money Bill since it gives effect to tax changes proposed in the Union Budget. A Money Bill is defined in Article 110 of the Constitution as one which only contains provisions related to taxation, borrowings by the government, or expenditure from Consolidated Fund of India. A Money Bill only needs the approval of Lok Sabha, and is sent to Rajya Sabha for its recommendations. It is deemed to be passed by Rajya Sabha if it does not pass the Bill within 14 calendar days.
In addition to tax changes, the Finance Bill, 2017 proposes to amend several laws such the Securities Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Payment and Settlements Act, 2007 to make structural changes such as creating a payments regulator and changing the composition of the Securities Appellate Tribunal. This week, some amendments to the Finance Bill were circulated. We discuss the provisions of the Bill, and the proposed amendments.
Certain Tribunals to be replaced
Amendments to the Finance Bill seek to replace certain Tribunals and transfer their functions to existing Tribunals. The rationale behind replacing these Tribunals is unclear. For example, the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) will replace the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Appellate Tribunal. It is unclear if TDSAT, which primarily deals with issues related to telecom disputes, will have the expertise to adjudicate matters related to the pricing of airport services. Similarly, it is unclear if the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, which will replace the Competition Appellate Tribunal, will have the expertise to deal with matters related to anti-competitive practices.
Terms of service of Tribunal members to be determined by central government
The amendments propose that the central government may make rules to provide for the terms of service including appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances, and removal for Chairpersons and other members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and other authorities. The amendments also cap the age of retirement for Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons. Currently, these terms are specified in the laws establishing these Tribunals.
One may argue that allowing the government to determine the appointment, reappointment and removal of members could affect the independent functioning of the Tribunals. There could be conflict of interest if the government were to be a litigant before a Tribunal as well as determine the appointment of its members and presiding officers.
The Supreme Court in 2014, while examining a case related to the National Tax Tribunal, had held that Appellate Tribunals have similar powers and functions as that of High Courts, and hence matters related to their members’ appointment and reappointment must be free from executive involvement.[i] The list of Tribunals under this amendment includes several Tribunals before which the central government could be a party to disputes, such as those related to income tax, railways, administrative matters, and the armed forces Tribunal.
Note that a Bill to establish uniform conditions of service for the chairpersons and members of some Tribunals has been pending in Parliament since 2014.
Inclusion of technical members in the Securities Appellate Tribunal
The composition of the Securities Appellate Tribunal established under the SEBI Act is being changed by the Finance Bill. Currently, the Tribunal consists of a Presiding Officer and two other members appointed by the central government. This composition is to be changed to: a Presiding Officer, and a number of judicial and technical members, as notified by the central government.
Creation of a Payments Regulatory Board
Recently, the Ratan Watal Committee under the Finance Ministry had recommended creating a statutory Payments Regulatory Board to oversee the payments systems in light of increase in digital payments. The Finance Bill, 2017 seeks to give effect to this recommendation by creating a Payments Regulatory Board chaired by the RBI Governor and including members nominated by the central government. This Board will replace the existing Board for Regulation and Supervision of Payment and Settlement Systems.
Political funding
The Finance Bill, 2017 proposes to make changes related to how donations may be made to political parties, and maintaining the anonymity of donors.
Currently, for donations below Rs 20,000, details of donors do not have to be disclosed by political parties. Further, there are no restrictions on the amount of cash donations that may be received by political parties from a person. The Finance Bill has proposed to set this limit at Rs 2,000. The Bill also introduces a new mode of donating to political parties, i.e. through electoral bonds. These bonds will be issued by banks, which may be bought through cheque or electronic means. The only difference between cheque payment (above Rs 20,000) and electoral bonds may be that the identity of the donor will be anonymous in the case of electoral bonds.
Regarding donations by companies to political parties, the proposed amendments to the Finance Bill remove the: (i) existing limit of contributions that a company may make to political parties which currently is 7.5% of net profit of the last three financial years, (ii) requirement of a company to disclose the name of the parties to which a contribution has been made. In addition, the Bill also proposes that contributions to parties will have to be made only through a cheque, bank draft, electronic means, or any other instrument notified by the central government.
Aadhaar mandatory for PAN and Income Tax
Amendments to the Finance Bill, 2017 make it mandatory for every person to quote their Aadhaar number after July 1, 2017 when: (i) applying for a Permanent Account Number (PAN), or (ii) filing their Income Tax returns. Persons who do not have an Aadhaar will be required to quote their Aadhaar enrolment number indicating that an application to obtain Aadhaar has been filed.
Every person holding a PAN on July 1, 2017 will be required to provide the authorities with his Aadhaar number by a date and in a manner notified by the central government. Failure to provide this number would result in the PAN being invalidated.
The Finance Bill, 2017 is making structural changes to some laws. Parliamentary committees allow for a forum for detailed scrutiny, deliberations and public consultation on proposed laws. The opportunity to build rigour into the law-making process is lost if such legislative changes are not examined by committees
[i] Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India, Transfer Case No. 150 of 2006, Supreme Court of India, September 25, 2014 (para 89).
There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.
