There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.
Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha began today. No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power. Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha. This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha. Trust votes are used to examine this support. The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.
So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have been discussed. Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced. The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.
Figure 1: Trust votes in Parliament
Note: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.
Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.
The no-confidence motion being discussed today was moved on July 26, 2023. A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members. The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion. The Rules of Procedure state that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced. This year, the no-confidence motion was discussed 13 calendar days after introduction. Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha. In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction. On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.
Figure 2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok Sabha
Source: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.
Figure 3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motions
Note: Number of days implies calendar days.
Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.
On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days. Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003. Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by the Business Advisory Committee.
Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote. 26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected. This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence. On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive. He resigned before the motion was put to vote. 50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975. Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.
Figure 4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motions
Note: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.
Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.
In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history. The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all. The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place. Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s. During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority through confidence motions. These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.
Figure 5: Duration of discussion of confidence motions
Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.
Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted. On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority. On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote. Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House. He resigned 16 days into his term.
Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion. This time, it was put to vote. The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote. This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha. The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993. In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.
