There has been no resolution so far to the issue of assured fuel supply from Coal India Limited (CIL) to power producers.  According to reports, while CIL released a model supply agreement in April 2012, so far only around 13 Fuel Supply Agreements (FSAs) have been signed.  Originally around 50 power units were expected to sign FSAs with CIL.  Power producers have objected to the model FSA released by CIL, particularly its force majeure provisions and the dilution of financial penalties in case of lower than contracted supply. Background The adverse power supply situation has attracted greater attention in the past few months.  According to Central Electricity Authority's data, the gap between peak demand and peak supply of power in March 2012 was 11 per cent.  The decreasing availability of fuel has emerged as a critical component of the worsening power supply situation.  As of March 31, 2012, there were 32 critical thermal power stations that had a coal stock of less than 7 days.  The gap between demand and supply of coal in the past three years is highlighted below: Table 1: Coal demand/Supply gap (In millions of tonnes)

 

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

Demand

604

656

696

Supply

514

523

535

Gap

90

133

161

Source: PIB News Release dated May 7, 2012 Coal accounts for around 56 per cent of total installed power generation capacity in India.  Increased capacity in thermal power has also accounted for almost 81 per cent of the additional 62,374 MW added during the 11th Plan period.  Given the importance of coal in meeting national energy needs, the inability of CIL to meet its supply targets has become a major issue.  While the production target for CIL was 486 MT for 2011-12, its actual coal production was 436 MT. Fuel Supply Agreements In March 2012, the government asked CIL to sign FSAs with power plants that have been or would be commissioned by March 31, 2015.  These power plants should also have entered into long term Power Purchase Agreements with distribution companies.  After CIL did not sign FSAs by the deadline of March 31, 2012 the government issued a Presidential Directive to CIL on April 4, 2012 directing it to sign the FSAs.  The CIL board approved a model FSA in April 2012, which has not found acceptance by power producers. According to newspaper reports, many power producers have expressed their dissatisfaction with the model FSA released by CIL.  They have argued that it differs from the 2009 version of FSAs in some major ways.  These include:

  • The penalty for supplying coal below 80 per cent of the contracted amount has been reduced from 10 per cent to 0.01 per cent.  The penalty will be applicable only after three years.
  • The new FSA has extensive force majeure provisions that absolve CIL of non-supply in case of multiple contingencies – including equipment breakdown, power cuts, obstruction in transport, riots, failure to import coal due to “global shortage or delays… or no response to enquiries (by CIL) for supply of coal.”
  • CIL would have the discretion to annually review the supply level that would trigger a financial penalty.  There was no provision for such a review in the earlier FSA.

Most power producers, including NTPC, the country’s biggest power producer, have refused to sign the new FSA.  Reports suggest that the Power Minister has asked the Prime Minister’s Office to mandate CIL to sign FSAs within a month based on the 2009 format.  CIL has received a request from NTPC to consider signing FSAs based on the same parameters as their existing plants, but with the revised trigger point of 80 per cent (down from 90 per cent earlier). Underlying this situation is CIL’s own stagnating production.  Various experts have pointed to the prohibition on private sector participation in coal mining (apart from captive projects) and the backlog in granting environment and forest clearances as having exacerbated the coal supply situation.

In the aftermath of the nuclear leaks in Japan, there have been concerns regarding the safety of nuclear power plants around the world. There are some proposals to change the regulatory framework in India to ensure the safety of these plants. We examine some of the issues in the current structure.   Which body looks at safety issues regarding nuclear power plants in the country?   The apex institution tasked to look at issues regarding nuclear safety is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. The AERB was set up in 1983 to carry out regulatory and safety functions regarding nuclear and radiation facilities. The agency has to give clearances for establishing nuclear power plants and facilities.   It issues clearances for nuclear power projects in stages after safety reviews. The safety of setting up a nuclear plant in any given area is also assessed by the AERB. For example, it would have looked into the safety of setting up a nuclear power project in Jaitapur in Maharashtra.   AERB also reviews the safety mechanisms within existing nuclear plants and facilities. To do this, it requires nuclear facilities to report their compliance with safety regulations, and also makes periodic inspections.   Under the recently passed Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 the AERB is also the authority responsible for notifying when a nuclear incident takes place. Mechanisms for assessing and claiming compensation by victims will be initiated only after the nuclear incident is notified.   Why is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board in the news?   Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced on March 29, 2011, "We will strengthen the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and make it a truly autonomous and independent regulatory authority."   This announcement came in the backdrop of the continuing crisis and high radiation levels at the Fukusima nuclear plant in Japan.   News reports opined that the lack of proper autonomy of Japan's nuclear regulator curbed its effectiveness. Japan's ministry of economy, trade and industry regulates the nuclear power industry, and also promotes nuclear technology. These two aims work at cross-purposes. India's regulatory structure is similar to Japan in some respects.   What measures has the AERB taken post the Fukushima nuclear incident in Japan?   Following the nuclear incident in Japan, a high-level committee under the chairmanship of a former AERB chairman has been set up to review the safety of Indian nuclear power plants.   The committee shall assess the capability of Indian nuclear power plants to withstand earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, floods, etc. The committee will review the adequacy of provisions for ensuring safety in case of such events.   Is there any issue in the current regulatory structure?   The AERB is a regulatory body, which derives administrative and financial support from the Department of Atomic Energy. It reports to the secreatry, DAE.   The DAE is also involved in the promotion of nuclear energy, and is also responsible for the functioning of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, which operates most nuclear power plants in the country.     The DAE is thus responsible both for nuclear safety (through the AERB), as well as the operation of nuclear power plants (through NPCIL). This could be seen as a conflict of interest.   How does the system of independent regulators differ from this?   The telecom sector provides an example of an independent regulator.   The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India does not report to the Department of Telecommunications. The DoT is responsible for policy matters related to telecommunications, promoting private investment in telecom, and also has a stake in BSNL. Had TRAI reported to the DoT, there would have been a conflict of interest within the DoT.   What will the proposed legislation change?   Recent news reports have stated that a bill to create an independent regulatory body will be introduced in Parliament soon.   Though there is no draft bill available publicly, news reports state that an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority of India will be created by the bill, and the authority will subsume the AERB within it.   This post first appeared as an article on rediff.com and can be accessed here.