Several Rajya Sabha seats go to elections this year. The President and the Vice-President are also due to be elected by August. We analyse the impact of the recent State Assembly elections on the composition of the Rajya Sabha and the outcome of the Presidential polls. Rajya Sabha - How will its composition change? Since Rajya Sabha members are elected by the elected members of State Legislative Assemblies, a change in the composition of State Assemblies can affect the composition of Rajya Sabha. A total of 61 Rajya Sabha seats are up for election in April and July. This includes 10 seats from Uttar Pradesh and 1 seat from Uttarakhand. In light of the recent Assembly elections, we work out two scenarios to estimate the composition of Rajya Sabha in 2012. Members of Rajya Sabha are elected through the system of proportional representation by means of the Single Transferable Vote (STV). In an STV election, a candidate is required to achieve a certain minimum number of votes (called the 'quota') to be elected. (For more details on the STV system, click here) For instance, in the case of Uttar Pradesh (UP) 10 Rajya Sabha seats go to election this year. Candidates will be elected to these 10 seats by the 403 elected MLAs of the Uttar Pradesh State Assembly. Each MLA will rank the candidates based on his/ her preference. After successive rounds of elimination, candidates who are able to secure at least 37 {or 403/(10+1) } votes will be declared elected. In the new UP Assembly, Samajwadi Party (SP) has a total strength of 224 members. As a result, SP can elect at least 6 (or 224/37) Rajya Sabha MPs of its choice. BSP's strength of 80 will allow it to elect 2 (or 80/37) MPs to Rajya Sabha. Similarily, the BJP with a strength of 47 MLAs can have one candidate of its choice elected to the Rajya Sabha. This leaves 1 seat. The fate of this seat depends on the alliances that may be formed since no other party in UP has 37 or more seats in the Assembly. If the Congress (28 seats) and RLD (9 seats) join hands, they may be able to elect a candidate of their choice. We build two scenarios which give the likely range of seats for the major coalitions and parties. The actual result will likely fall between these scenarios, depending on alliances for each election. Of the two scenarios, Scenario II is better for the UPA. It is based on the assumption that the UPA is able to put together the necessary support/ alliances to get its candidates elected to seats with indeterminate status. Scenario I is based on the assumption that the UPA is not able to put together the required support. As a result, the seats in question get allocated to candidates from other parties/ coalitions. (See Notes for the composition of the coalitions) Composition of Rajya Sabha
| Party/ Coalition | Current composition | Scenario I | Scenario II |
| Total seats |
245 |
245 |
245 |
| UPA |
93 |
95 |
98 |
| NDA |
66 |
67 |
65 |
| Left |
19 |
14 |
14 |
| BSP |
18 |
15 |
15 |
| SP |
5 |
9 |
9 |
| BJD |
6 |
8 |
7 |
| AIADMK |
5 |
5 |
5 |
| Nominated |
7 |
12 |
12 |
| Others |
21 |
20 |
20 |
| Vacant |
5 |
0 |
0 |
It appears that there would not be a major change in the composition of the Rajya Sabha. Which party's candidate is likely to become the next President? The next Presidential election will be held in June or July. The electoral college for the Presidential election consists of the elected members of Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies. Each MP/ MLA’s vote has a pre-determined value based on the population they represent. For instance, an MP's vote has a value of 708, an MLA from UP has a vote value of 208 and an MLA from Sikkim has a vote value of 7. (Note that all MPs, irrespective of the constituency or State they represent, have equal vote value) As is evident, changes in the composition of Assemblies in larger States such as UP can have a major impact on the outcome of the Presidential election. The elections to the office of the President are held through the system of proportional representation by means of STV (same as in the case of Rajya Sabha). The winning candidate must secure at least 50% of the total value of votes polled. (For details, refer to this Election Commission document). By this calculation, a candidate will need at least 5,48,507 votes to be elected as the President. If the UPA were to vote as a consolidated block, its vote tally would reach 4,50,555 votes under Scenario II (the one that is favourable for the UPA). Therefore, the UPA will have to seek alliances if it wants a candidate of its choice to be elected to the office of the President. Scenarios for Presidential elections (figures represent the value of votes available with each party/ coalition)
| Party/ Coalition | Scenario I | Scenario II |
| UPA |
4,48,431 |
4,50,555 |
| NDA |
3,05,328 |
3,03,912 |
| Left |
51,574 |
51,574 |
| BSP |
43,723 |
43,723 |
| SP |
69,651 |
69,651 |
| BJD |
30,923 |
30,215 |
| AIADMK |
36,216 |
36,216 |
| Others |
1,11,166 |
1,11,166 |
| Total |
10,97,012 |
10,97,012 |
| Minimum required to be elected |
5,48,507 |
5,48,507 |
What about the Vice-President? Elections to the office of the Vice-President (VP) will be held in July or August. The electoral college will consist of all members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (i.e. both elected and nominated). Unlike the Presidential elections, all votes will have an equal value of one. Like the President, the VP is also elected through the system of proportional representation by means of STV. The winning candidate must secure at least 50% of the total value of votes polled. Presently, two seats are vacant in the Lok Sabha. If we exclude these from our analysis, we find that a candidate will need at least 395 votes to be elected as the VP. Under our best case scenario, the UPA holds 363 votes in the forthcoming VP elections. As is the case with Presidential elections, the UPA will have to seek alliances to get a candidate of its choice elected to the office of the Vice-President. Scenarios for VP elections (figures represent the value of votes available with each party/ coalition)
| Party/ Coalition |
Scenario I |
Scenario II |
| UPA |
360 |
363 |
| NDA |
216 |
214 |
| Left |
38 |
38 |
| BSP |
36 |
36 |
| SP |
31 |
31 |
| BJD |
22 |
21 |
| AIADMK |
14 |
14 |
| Nominated |
14 |
14 |
| Others |
57 |
57 |
| Total |
788 |
788 |
| Minimum required to be elected |
395 |
395 |
Notes: [1] UPA: Congress, Trinamool, DMK, NCP,Rashtriya Lok Dal, J&K National Conference, Muslim League Kerala State Committee, Kerala Congress (M), All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, Sikkim Democratic Front, Praja Rajyam Party, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi [2] NDA: BJP, JD(U), Shiv Sena, Shiromani Akali Dal [3] Left: CPI(M), CPI, Revolutionary Socialist Party,All India Forward Bloc
There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.
