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In a landmark judgment on April 12, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the provision in the Right to Education Act, 2009 that makes it mandatory for all schools (government and private) except private, unaided minority schools to reserve 25% of their seats for children belonging to “weaker section and disadvantaged group”.  The verdict was given by a three-judge bench namely Justice S.H. Kapadia (CJI), Justice Swatanter Kumar and Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan.  However, the judgment was not unanimous.  Justice Radhakrishnan gave a dissenting view to the majority judgment. According to news reports (here and here), some school associations are planning to file review petitions against the Supreme Court order (under Article 137 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may review any judgment or order made by it.  A review petition may be filed if there is (a) discovery of new evidence, (b) an error apparent on the face of the record, or (c) any other sufficient reason). In this post, we summarise the views of the judges. Background of the petition The 86th (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2002 added Article 21A to the Constitution which makes it mandatory for the State to provide free and compulsory education to all children from the age of six to 14 years (fundamental right).  The Parliament enacted the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 to give effect to this amendment. The Act provides that children between the ages of six and 14 years have the right to free and compulsory education in a neighbourhood school.  It also lays down the minimum norms that each school has to follow in order to get legal recognition.  The Act required government schools to provide free and compulsory education to all admitted children. Similarly, aided schools have to provide free and compulsory education proportionate to the funding received, subject to a minimum of 25%. However, controversy erupted over Section 12(1)(c) and (2) of the Act, which required private, unaided schools to admit at least 25% of students from SCs, STs, low-income and other disadvantaged or weaker groups.  The Act stated that these schools shall be reimbursed for either their tuition charge or the per-student expenditure in government schools, whichever is lower.  After the Act was notified on April 1, 2010, the Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of this provision on the ground that it impinged on their right to run educational institutions without government interference. Summary of the judgment Majority The Act is constitutionally valid and shall apply to (a) government controlled schools, (b) aided schools (including minority administered schools), and (c) unaided, non-minority schools.  The reasons are given below: First, Article 21A makes it obligatory on the State to provide free and compulsory education to all children between 6 and 14 years of age.  However, the manner in which the obligation shall be discharged is left to the State to determine by law.  Therefore, the State has the freedom to decide whether it shall fulfill its obligation through its own schools, aided schools or unaided schools.  The 2009 Act is “child centric” and not “institution centric”.  The main question was whether the Act violates Article 19(1)(g) which gives every citizen the right to practice a profession or carry out any occupation, trade or business.  However, the Constitution provides that Article 19(1)(g) may be circumscribed by Article 19(6), which allow reasonable restriction over this right in the interest of the general public.  The Court stated that since “education” is recognized as a charitable activity [see TMA Pai Foundation vs State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481] reasonable restriction may apply. Second, the Act places a burden on the State as well as parents/guardians to ensure that every child has the right to education.  Thus, the right to education “envisages a reciprocal agreement between the State and the parents and it places an affirmative burden on all stakeholders in our civil society.”  The private, unaided schools supplement the primary obligation of the State to provide for free and compulsory education to the specified category of students. Third, TMA Pai and P.A. Inamdar judgments hold that the right to establish and administer educational institutions fall within Article 19(1)(g).  It includes right to admit students and set up reasonable fee structure.  However, these principles were applied in the context of professional/higher education where merit and excellence have to be given due weightage.  This does not apply to a child seeking admission in Class I.  Also, Section 12(1)(c) of the Act seeks to remove financial obstacle.  Therefore, the 2009 Act should be read with Article 19(6) which provides for reasonable restriction on Article 19(1)(g).  However, the government should clarify the position with regard to boarding schools and orphanages. The Court also ruled that the 2009 Act shall not apply to unaided, minority schools since they are protected by Article 30(1) (all minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice).  This right of the minorities is not circumscribed by reasonable restriction as is the case under Article 19(1)(g). Dissenting judgment Article 21A casts an obligation on the State to provide free and compulsory education to children of the age of 6 to 14 years.  The obligation is not on unaided non-minority and minority educational institutions.  Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act can be operationalised only on the principles of voluntariness, autonomy and consensus for unaided schools and not on compulsion or threat of non-recognition.  The reasons for such a judgment are given below: First, Article 21A says that the “State shall provide” not “provide for”.  Therefore, the constitutional obligation is on the State and not on non-state actors to provide free and compulsory education to a specified category of children.  Also, under Article 51A(k) of the Constitution, parents or guardians have a duty to provide opportunities for education to their children but not a constitutional obligation. Second, each citizen has the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution “investing his own capital” under Article 19(1)(g).  This right can be curtailed in the interest of the general public by imposing reasonable restrictions.  Citizens do not have any constitutional obligation to start an educational institution.  Therefore, according to judgments of TMA Pai and PA Inamdar, they do not have any constitutional obligation to share seats with the State or adhere to a fee structure determined by the State.  Compelling them to do so would amount to nationalization of seats and would constitute serious infringement on the autonomy of the institutions. Rights guaranteed to the unaided non-minority and minority educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30(1) can only be curtailed through a constitutional amendment (for example, insertion of Article 15(5) that allows reservation of seats in private educational institutions). Third, no distinction can be drawn between unaided minority and non-minority schools with regard to appropriation of quota by the State. Other issues related to the 2009 Act Apart from the issue of reservation, the RTE Act raises other issues such as lack of accountability of government schools and lack of focus on learning outcomes even though a number of studies have pointed to low levels of learning among school children.  (For a detailed analysis, please see PRS Brief on the Bill).

Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23.  This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand.   This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.

Overview of financial losses

For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses.  Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees.  In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues.  State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power.  These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt.  In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.

Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21.  Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards.  Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available.  The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore.   This increase has been driven by rising costs.  At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).

Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies

Details

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Average cost of supplying power (ACS)

7.4

7.7

7.6

8.6

Average revenue realised (ARR)

6.8

7.1

7.3

7.8

Per unit loss (ACS-ARR)

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.7

Total losses (in Rs crore)

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21.  Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards.  Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available.  The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity.  The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.

Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand

In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22.  Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%.  Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers.  These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.

Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.

Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand.  The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year.  It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units.   However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).

To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up.  Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22.  To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal.  The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.

Sources:  Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.

Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23.  While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector.  In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne.   This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase.  Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.   

Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.

Coal import situation going forward

In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023.   It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%.   This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24.  Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.  

image

Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.

Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances

Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues.  Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos).  Power purchase costs in these contracts  do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged.  Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks.  As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years.  In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost.  This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments.  However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt.  In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.  

Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased.  In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22.  Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore.  Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.  

Risk to state finances

Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances.  These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.  

Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2).  As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP.  Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP).  Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.    

Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years

Year

Scheme

Details

2002

Bailout Package

States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs

2012

Financial Restructuring Package

States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore

2015

Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY)

States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses

2020

Liquidity Infusion Scheme

Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee

2022

Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme

Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure

Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.

For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here.  For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.  
 

ANNEXURE

Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)

Details

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Average cost of supplying power (ACS)

7.4

7.7

7.6

8.6

    of which

       

    Cost of procuring power 

5.8

5.9

5.8

6.6

Average revenue realised (ARR)

6.8

7.1

7.3

7.8

    of which

       

    Revenue from sale of power

5.0

4.9

5.1

5.5

    Tariff subsidy

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.5

       Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY

0.3

0.1

0.0

0.2

Per unit loss

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.7

Total financial losses

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)

State/UT

2017-18

2018-19

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

-605

-645

-678

-757

-86

-76

Andhra Pradesh

-546

-16,831

1,103

-6,894

-2,595

1,211

Arunachal Pradesh

-429

-420

NA

NA

NA

NA

Assam

-259

311

1,141

-107

357

-800

Bihar

-1,872

-1,845

-2,913

-2,966

-2,546

-10

Chandigarh

321

131

59

79

-101

NA

Chhattisgarh

-739

-814

-571

-713

-807

-1,015

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu

312

-149

-125

NA

NA

NA

Delhi

NA

NA

NA

98

57

-141

Goa

26

-121

-276

78

117

69

Gujarat

426

184

314

429

371

147

Haryana

412

281

331

637

849

975

Himachal Pradesh

-44

132

43

-153

-141

-1,340

Jharkhand

-212

-730

-1,111

-2,556

-1,721

-3,545

Karnataka

-2,439

-4,889

-2,501

-5,382

4,719

-2,414

Kerala

-784

-135

-270

-483

98

-1,022

Ladakh

NA

NA

NA

NA

-11

-57

Lakshadweep

-98

-120

-115

-117

NA

NA

Madhya Pradesh

-5,802

-9,713

-5,034

-9,884

-2,354

1,842

Maharashtra

-3,927

2,549

-5,011

-7,129

-1,147

-19,846

Manipur

-8

-42

-15

-15

-22

-146

Meghalaya

-287

-202

-443

-101

-157

-193

Mizoram

87

-260

-291

-115

-59

-158

Nagaland

-62

-94

-477

-17

24

33

Puducherry

5

-39

-306

-23

84

-131

Punjab

-2,760

363

-975

49

1,680

-1,375

Rajasthan

-11,314

-12,524

-12,277

-5,994

2,374

-2,024

Sikkim

-29

-3

-179

-34

NA

71

Tamil Nadu

-12,541

-17,186

-16,528

-13,066

-9,130

-9,192

Telangana

-6,697

-9,525

-6,966

-6,686

-831

-11,103

Tripura

28

38

-104

-4

-127

-193

Uttar Pradesh

-5,269

-5,902

-3,866

-10,660

-6,498

-15,512

Uttarakhand

-229

-808

-323

-152

-21

-1,224

West Bengal

-871

-1,171

-1,867

-4,261

1,045

-1,663

State Sector

-56,206

-80,179

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu

NA

NA

NA 

242

148

104

Delhi

109

657

-975

1,876

521

-76

Gujarat 

574

307

612

655

522

627

Odisha 

NA

NA

-842

-853

940

746

Maharashtra 

NA

590

1,696

-375

360

42

Uttar Pradesh 

182

126

172

333

256

212

West Bengal 

658

377

379

398

66

-12

Private Sector

1,523

2,057

1,042

2,276

2,813

1,643

All-India

-54,683

-78,122

-59,189

-77,896

 -13,766 

 -67,189 

Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards. 
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.