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Recently there have been news reports about the NITI Aayog submitting its recommendations on improving the financial health of Air India to the Ministry of Finance.[1],[2] The Civil Aviation Ministers have also mentioned that the Ministry will soon propose a roadmap for the rejuvenation of the national airline. While the NITI Aayog report is not out in the public domain yet, we present a few details on the financial health of the airline.
Finances of Air India
In 2015-16, Air India earned a revenue of Rs 20,526 crore and registered losses of Rs 3,837 crore. As of March 31, 2015, the total debt of Air India was at Rs 51,367 crore.[3] This includes Rs 22,574 crore outstanding on account of aircraft loans. The figure below shows the losses incurred by Air India in the last few years (2007-16).
According to the Ministry of Civil Aviation, reasons for Air India’s losses include: (i) the adverse impact of exchange rate variation due to the weakening of Indian Rupee, (ii) high interest burden, (iii) increase in competition, especially from low cost carriers, and (iv) high fuel prices.[4] The National Transport Development Policy Committee (NTDPC), in its report in 2013, had observed that with the increase in the number of airlines in the market, Air India has been struggling to make a transition from a monopoly market to a competitive one.[5] These struggles have been primarily regarding improving its efficiency, and competing with the private airlines.
Turnaround Plan and Financial Restructuring
In order to bail out the company, the government had approved the Turnaround Plan (TAP) and Financial Restructuring Plan (FRP) of Air India in April 2012.[6] Under the plans, the government would infuse equity into Air India subject to meeting certain milestones such as Pay Load Factor (measures capacity utilisation), on time performance, fleet utilisation, yield factor (average fare paid per mile, per passenger), and rationalisation of the emolument structure of employees.7 The equity infusion included financial support towards the repayment of the principal, as well as the interest payments on the government loans for aircraft acquisition. Under the TAP/FRP, the central government was to infuse Rs 30,231 crore till 2020-21. As of 2016-17, the Ministry has infused an equity amount of Rs 24,745 crore.[7]
In 2017-18, the Ministry has allocated Rs 1,800 crore towards Air India which is 67% of the Ministry’s total budget for the year.[8] However, this amount is 30% lower than the TAP commitment of Rs 2,587 crore.3 In 2016-17, while Air India had sought and equity infusion of Rs 3,901 crore, the government approved Rs 2,465 crore as the equity infusion.[9] The Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism, and Culture examining the 2017-18 budget estimates noted that reducing the equity infusion in Air India might adversely affect the financial situation of the company.[10] It recommended that the government must allocate the amount committed under TAP. The Ministry had also observed that due to reduction of equity infusion, Air India has to arrange funds through borrowing which costs additional amount of interest to be paid by the government.[11]
As per the Ministry, Air India has achieved most of the targets set out in TAP.[12] Despite running into losses, it achieved an operating profit of Rs 105 crore in FY 2015-16.[13] Air India’s performance in some of the segments are provided in the table below.
Table 1: Air India’s performance
| 2011-12 | 2014-15 | |
| Overall Network On Time Performance (measures adherence to time schedule) | 68.2% | 72.7% |
| Passenger Load Factor (measures capacity utilisation of the airline) | 67.9% | 73.7% |
| Network Yield achieved (in Rs/ RPKM)* | 3.74 | 4.35 |
| Number of Revenue Passengers (in million) | 13.4 | 16.9 |
| Operating Loss (in Rs crore) | 5,139 | 2,171 |
* Note: RPKM or Revenue Passenger Kilometre performed refers to number of seats for which the carrier has earned revenue.
Sources: Lok Sabha Questions; PRS.
The NTDPC had observed that with its excessive and unproductive manpower, failure to invest in the technology required to keep it competitive, and poor operations, Air India’s future looks risky. It had also questioned the rationale for a national airline. It had suggested that the government must frame a decisive policy with regard to Air India, and clarify its future accordingly.5 It had recommended that Air India’s liabilities should be written off and be dealt with separately, and the airline should be run on complete operational and financial autonomy.5
Need for competitive framework in the sector
With the entrance of several private players in the market, the domestic aviation market has grown significantly in the last decade. The market share of an airline is directly related to its capacity share in the market. While private carriers have added capacity in the domestic market, the capacity induction (adding more aircrafts) of Air India has not kept up with the private carriers. This has resulted in decrease in market share of Air India from 17% in 2008-09 to 14% in 2016-17.[14]
The Committee looking at the competitive framework of the civil aviation sector had observed that the national carrier gets preferential treatment through access to government funding, and flying rights.[15] It had recommended that competitive neutrality should be ensured between private carriers and the national carrier, which could be achieved by removing the regulations that provide such preferential treatment to Air India. The NTDPC had also noted that the presence of a state-owned enterprise should not distort the market for other private players.6 It had recommended that the Ministry should consider developing regulations that improve the overall financial health of the airline sector.
While Air India’s performance has improved following the TAP, along with the equity infusion from government, its debt still remains high and has been gradually increasing. In light of this, it remains to be seen what the government will propose with regard to the rejuvenation of the national airline, and ensure a competitive and fair market for all the players in the airline market.
[1] “Govt to prepare Air India revival plan within 3 months, amid calls for privatization”, Livemint, May 31, 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/0koi5Hyidj1gVD3wOWTruM/Govt-says-all-options-open-for-Air-India-revival.html.
[2] “Air India selloff: Fixing airline’s future is more important than past”, Financial Express, May 31, 2017, http://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/why-fixing-air-indias-future-more-important-than-past/693777/.
[3] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 382, Ministry of Civil Aviation, February 25, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=28931&lsno=16.
[4] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 353, Ministry of Civil Aviation, November 17, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=40733&lsno=16.
[5] “Volume 3, Chapter 3: Civil Aviation”, India Transport Report: Moving India to 2032, National Transport Development Policy Committee, June 17, 2014, http://planningcommission.nic.in/sectors/NTDPC/volume3_p1/civil_v3_p1.pdf.
[6] “Government Approves Financial Restructuring and Turn Around Plan of Air India”, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA), April 12, 2012, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=82231.
[7] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 472, Ministry of Civil Aviation, April 6, 2017, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=51752&lsno=16.
[8] Notes on Demands for Grants 2017-18, Demand no 9, Ministry of Civil Aviation, http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2017-18/eb/sbe9.pdf.
[9] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 4809, Ministry of Civil Aviation, March 30, 2017, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=51108&lsno=16.
[10] “244th report: Demand for Grants (2017-18) of Ministry of Civil Aviation”, Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture, March 17, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Transport,%20Tourism%20and%20Culture/244.pdf.
[11] “218th report: Demand for Grants (2015-16) of Ministry of Civil Aviation”, Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture, April 28, 2015.
[12] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 307, Ministry of Civil Aviation, February 25, 2016, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/7/AU307.pdf.
[13] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 1566, Ministry of Civil Aviation, March 9, 2017, http://www.loksabha.nic.in/Members/QResult16.aspx?qref=47532.
[14] Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred question no 312, Ministry of Civil Aviation, March 23, 2017, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=49742&lsno=16.
[15] Report of the Committee Constituted for examination of the recommendations made in the Study Report on Competitive Framework of Civil Aviation Sector in India, Ministry of Civil Aviation, June 2012, http://civilaviation.gov.in/sites/default/files/moca_001870_0.pdf.
Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23. This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand. This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.
Overview of financial losses
For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses. Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees. In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues. State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power. These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt. In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore. This increase has been driven by rising costs. At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).
Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies
|
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
|
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
|
Per unit loss (ACS-ARR) |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
|
Total losses (in Rs crore) |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21. Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards. Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available. The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity. The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.
Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand
In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22. Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%. Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers. These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.
Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.
Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand. The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year. It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units. However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).
To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up. Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22. To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal. The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.
Sources: Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.
Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23. While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector. In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne. This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase. Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.
Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.
Coal import situation going forward
In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023. It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%. This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24. Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.
Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.
Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances
Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues. Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos). Power purchase costs in these contracts do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged. Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks. As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years. In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost. This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments. However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt. In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.
Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased. In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22. Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore. Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.
Risk to state finances
Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances. These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.
Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2). As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP. Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP). Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.
Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years
|
Year |
Scheme |
Details |
|
2002 |
Bailout Package |
States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs |
|
2012 |
Financial Restructuring Package |
States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore |
|
2015 |
Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) |
States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses |
|
2020 |
Liquidity Infusion Scheme |
Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee |
|
2022 |
Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme |
Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure |
Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.
For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here. For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.
ANNEXURE
Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)
|
Details |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Average cost of supplying power (ACS) |
7.4 |
7.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
|
of which |
||||
|
Cost of procuring power |
5.8 |
5.9 |
5.8 |
6.6 |
|
Average revenue realised (ARR) |
6.8 |
7.1 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
|
of which |
||||
|
Revenue from sale of power |
5.0 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
5.5 |
|
Tariff subsidy |
1.3 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.5 |
|
Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY |
0.3 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
0.2 |
|
Per unit loss |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
|
Total financial losses |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)
|
State/UT |
2017-18 |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
2020-21 |
2021-22 |
2022-23 |
|
Andaman and Nicobar Islands |
-605 |
-645 |
-678 |
-757 |
-86 |
-76 |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
-546 |
-16,831 |
1,103 |
-6,894 |
-2,595 |
1,211 |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
-429 |
-420 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Assam |
-259 |
311 |
1,141 |
-107 |
357 |
-800 |
|
Bihar |
-1,872 |
-1,845 |
-2,913 |
-2,966 |
-2,546 |
-10 |
|
Chandigarh |
321 |
131 |
59 |
79 |
-101 |
NA |
|
Chhattisgarh |
-739 |
-814 |
-571 |
-713 |
-807 |
-1,015 |
|
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
312 |
-149 |
-125 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Delhi |
NA |
NA |
NA |
98 |
57 |
-141 |
|
Goa |
26 |
-121 |
-276 |
78 |
117 |
69 |
|
Gujarat |
426 |
184 |
314 |
429 |
371 |
147 |
|
Haryana |
412 |
281 |
331 |
637 |
849 |
975 |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
-44 |
132 |
43 |
-153 |
-141 |
-1,340 |
|
Jharkhand |
-212 |
-730 |
-1,111 |
-2,556 |
-1,721 |
-3,545 |
|
Karnataka |
-2,439 |
-4,889 |
-2,501 |
-5,382 |
4,719 |
-2,414 |
|
Kerala |
-784 |
-135 |
-270 |
-483 |
98 |
-1,022 |
|
Ladakh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
-11 |
-57 |
|
Lakshadweep |
-98 |
-120 |
-115 |
-117 |
NA |
NA |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
-5,802 |
-9,713 |
-5,034 |
-9,884 |
-2,354 |
1,842 |
|
Maharashtra |
-3,927 |
2,549 |
-5,011 |
-7,129 |
-1,147 |
-19,846 |
|
Manipur |
-8 |
-42 |
-15 |
-15 |
-22 |
-146 |
|
Meghalaya |
-287 |
-202 |
-443 |
-101 |
-157 |
-193 |
|
Mizoram |
87 |
-260 |
-291 |
-115 |
-59 |
-158 |
|
Nagaland |
-62 |
-94 |
-477 |
-17 |
24 |
33 |
|
Puducherry |
5 |
-39 |
-306 |
-23 |
84 |
-131 |
|
Punjab |
-2,760 |
363 |
-975 |
49 |
1,680 |
-1,375 |
|
Rajasthan |
-11,314 |
-12,524 |
-12,277 |
-5,994 |
2,374 |
-2,024 |
|
Sikkim |
-29 |
-3 |
-179 |
-34 |
NA |
71 |
|
Tamil Nadu |
-12,541 |
-17,186 |
-16,528 |
-13,066 |
-9,130 |
-9,192 |
|
Telangana |
-6,697 |
-9,525 |
-6,966 |
-6,686 |
-831 |
-11,103 |
|
Tripura |
28 |
38 |
-104 |
-4 |
-127 |
-193 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
-5,269 |
-5,902 |
-3,866 |
-10,660 |
-6,498 |
-15,512 |
|
Uttarakhand |
-229 |
-808 |
-323 |
-152 |
-21 |
-1,224 |
|
West Bengal |
-871 |
-1,171 |
-1,867 |
-4,261 |
1,045 |
-1,663 |
|
State Sector |
-56,206 |
-80,179 |
-60,231 |
-76,899 |
-16,579 |
-68,832 |
|
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu |
NA |
NA |
NA |
242 |
148 |
104 |
|
Delhi |
109 |
657 |
-975 |
1,876 |
521 |
-76 |
|
Gujarat |
574 |
307 |
612 |
655 |
522 |
627 |
|
Odisha |
NA |
NA |
-842 |
-853 |
940 |
746 |
|
Maharashtra |
NA |
590 |
1,696 |
-375 |
360 |
42 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
182 |
126 |
172 |
333 |
256 |
212 |
|
West Bengal |
658 |
377 |
379 |
398 |
66 |
-12 |
|
Private Sector |
1,523 |
2,057 |
1,042 |
2,276 |
2,813 |
1,643 |
|
All-India |
-54,683 |
-78,122 |
-59,189 |
-77,896 |
-13,766 |
-67,189 |
Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.
