The Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017 was introduced in Lok Sabha during Monsoon Session 2017. The Bill is currently being examined by a Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament. It seeks to establish a Resolution Corporation which will monitor the risk faced by financial firms such as banks and insurance companies, and resolve them in case of failure. For FAQs explaining the regulatory framework under the Bill, please see here.
Over the last few days, there has been some discussion around provisions of the Bill which allow for cancellation or writing down of liabilities of a financial firm (known as bail-in).[1],[2] There are concerns that these provisions may put depositors in an unfavourable position in case a bank fails. In this context, we explain the bail-in process below.
What is bail-in?
The Bill specifies various tools to resolve a failing financial firm which include transferring its assets and liabilities, merging it with another firm, or liquidating it. One of these methods allows for a financial firm on the verge of failure to be rescued by internally restructuring its debt. This method is known as bail-in.
Bail-in differs from a bail-out which involves funds being infused by external sources to resolve a firm. This includes a failing firm being rescued by the government.
How does it work?
Under bail-in, the Resolution Corporation can internally restructure the firm’s debt by: (i) cancelling liabilities that the firm owes to its creditors, or (ii) converting its liabilities into any other instrument (e.g., converting debt into equity), among others.[3]
Bail-in may be used in cases where it is necessary to continue the services of the firm, but the option of selling it is not feasible.[4] This method allows for losses to be absorbed and consequently enables the firm to carry on business for a reasonable time period while maintaining market confidence.3 The Bill allows the Resolution Corporation to either resolve a firm by only using bail-in, or use bail-in as part of a larger resolution scheme in combination with other resolution methods like a merger or acquisition.
Do the current laws in India allow for bail-in? What happens to bank deposits in case of failure?
Current laws governing resolution of financial firms do not contain provisions for a bail in. If a bank fails, it may either be merged with another bank or liquidated.
In case of bank deposits, amounts up to one lakh rupees are insured by the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC). In the absence of the bank having sufficient resources to repay deposits above this amount, depositors will lose their money. The DICGC Act, 1961 originally insured deposits up to Rs 1,500 and permitted the DICGC to increase this amount with the approval of the central government. The current insured amount of one lakh rupees was fixed in May 1993.[5] The Bill has a similar provision which allows the Resolution Corporation to set the insured amount in consultation with the RBI.
Does the Bill specify safeguards for creditors, including depositors?
The Bill specifies that the power of the Corporation while using bail-in to resolve a firm will be limited. There are certain safeguards which seek to protect creditors and ensure continuity of critical functions of the firm. 
When resolving a firm through bail-in, the Corporation will have to ensure that none of the creditors (including bank depositors) receive less than what they would have been entitled to receive if the firm was to be liquidated.[6],[7]
Further, the Bill allows a liability to be cancelled or converted under bail-in only if the creditor has given his consent to do so in the contract governing such debt. The terms and conditions of bank deposits will determine whether the bail-in clause can be applied to them.
Do other countries contain similar provisions?
After the global financial crisis in 2008, several countries such as the US and those across Europe developed specialised resolution capabilities. This was aimed at preventing another crisis and sought to strengthen mechanisms for monitoring and resolving sick financial firms.
The Financial Stability Board, an international body comprising G20 countries (including India), recommended that countries should allow resolution of firms by bail-in under their jurisdiction. The European Union also issued a directive proposing a structure for member countries to follow while framing their respective resolution laws. This directive suggested that countries should include bail-in among their resolution tools. Countries such as UK and Germany have provided for bail-in under their laws. However, this method has rarely been used.7,[8] One of the rare instances was in 2013, when bail-in was used to resolve a bank in Cyprus.
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[1] ‘Modi government’s FRDI bill may take away all your hard-earned money’, India Today, December 5, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/frdi-bill-banking-reforms-modi-government-india-parliament/1/1103422.html.
[2] ‘Bail-in doubts — on financial resolution legislation’, The Hindu, December 5, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/bail-in-doubts/article21261606.ece.
[3] Section 52, The Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017.
[4] Report of the Committee to Draft Code on Resolution of Financial Firms, September 2016, http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Financial%20Resolution%20Bill,%202017/FRDI%20Bill%20Drafting%20Committee%20Report.pdf.
[5] The Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/dicgc_act.pdf. s
[6] Section 55, The Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017.
[7] The Bank of England’s approach to resolution, October 2014, Bank of England.
[8] Recovery and resolution, BaFin, Federal Financial Supervisory Authority of Germany, https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/BankenFinanzdienstleister/Massnahmen/SanierungAbwicklung/sanierung_abwicklung_artikel_en.html.
Mr. Vaghul, our first Chairperson, passed away on Saturday. I write this note to express my deep gratitude to him, and to celebrate his life. And what a life he lived!
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Mr. Vaghul and I at his residence |
Our past and present Chairpersons, |
Industry stalwarts have spoken about his contributions to the financial sector, his mentorship of people and institutions across finance, industry and non-profits. I don’t want to repeat that (though I was a beneficiary as a young professional starting my career at ICICI Securities). I want to note here some of the ways he helped shape PRS.
Mr Vaghul was our first chairman, from 2012 to 2018. When he joined the board, we were in deep financial crisis. Our FCRA application had been turned down (I still don’t know the reason), and we were trying to survive on monthly fund raise. Mr Vaghul advised us to raise funds from domestic philanthropists. “PRS works to make Indian democracy more effective. We should not rely on foreigners to do this.”. He was sure that Indian philanthropists would fund us. “We’ll try our best. But if it doesn’t work, we may shut down. Are you okay with that?” Of course, with him calling up people, we survived the crisis.
He also suggested that we should have an independent board without any representation from funders. The output should be completely independent of funders’ interest given that we were working in the policy space. We have stuck to this advice.
Even when he was 80, he could read faster than anyone and remember everything. I once said something in a board meeting which had been written in the note sent earlier. “We have all read the note. Let us discuss the implications.” And he could think three steps ahead of everyone else.
He had a light touch as a chairman. When I asked for management advice, he would ask me to solve the problem on my own. He saw his role as guiding the larger strategy, help raise funds and ensure that the organisation had a strong value system. Indeed, he was the original Karmayogi – I have an email from him which says, “Continue with the good work. We should neither be euphoric with appreciation or distracted by criticism.” And another, "Those who adhere to the truth need not be afraid of the consequences".
The best part about board meetings was the chat afterwards. He would have us in splits with stories from his experience. Some of these are in his memoirs, but we heard a few juicier ones too!
Even after he retired from our Board, he was always available to meet. I just needed to message him whenever I was in Madras, and he would ask me to come home. And Mrs. Vaghul was a welcoming host. Filter coffee, great advice, juicy stories, what more could one ask for?
Goodbye Mr. Vaghul. Your life lives on through the institutions you nurtured. And hope that we live up to your standards.
Madhavan
