The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021 was introduced in Lok Sabha today. It seeks to dissolve certain existing appellate bodies and transfer their functions (such as adjudication of appeals) to existing judicial bodies (mainly high courts) (see Table 1). It also amends the Finance Act, 2017, to bring certain provisions (such as qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances of tribunal members) under the purview of the Bill. Currently, these provisions are notified through Rules under the Finance Act, 2017.
Note that the 2017 Act reorganised the Indian tribunal system to ensure uniformity in their administration by amalgamating certain tribunals based on the similarity in their functional domain. It also delegated powers to the central government to make Rules to provide for the qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances, removal, and other conditions of service for chairpersons and members of these tribunals.
This Bill replaces an Ordinance with similar provisions that was promulgated in April 2021. The 2021 Ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court over its compliance with past Supreme Court judgements. In July 2021, the Court struck down certain provisions of the Ordinance, such as the four-year term of office for members, and the minimum age bar of 50 years to be appointed as a member of a tribunal. Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of key provisions of the 2021 Bill with the 2021 Ordinance and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgement. The Bill does not conform to the judgement of the Supreme Court and retains the provisions of the Ordinance that were struck down by the Court.
For an analysis of the 2021 Ordinance, please see our note here. For more details on the evolution of the tribunal system in India, please see our note.
Table 1: Transfer of functions of key appellate bodies as proposed under the Bill
|
Appellate body |
Role |
Proposed entity |
|
Appellate Tribunal under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 |
Adjudication of appeals against the Board of Film Certification |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Copyright Act, 1957 |
Adjudication of certain disputes and appeals against orders of the Registrar of Copyright. Disputes include those related to publications and term of the copyright |
Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of a High Court* |
|
Authority for Advance Rulings under the Customs Act, 1962 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Customs Authority for advance rulings |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under The Patents Act, 1970 |
Adjudication of appeals against decisions of the Controller on certain matters. Matters include applications for patents and restoration of patents. |
High Court |
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 |
Adjudication of:
|
|
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Highway Administration on matters including, grant of lease or licence of highway land, removal of unauthorised occupation, and prevention of damage to highway. |
Civil Court# |
|
Appellate Tribunal under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 |
Adjudication of appeals against certain orders of Registrar or Plant Varieties and Farmer Rights Authority |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
Notes: * Constituted under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; # Refers to a Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Parent Acts of the appellate bodies; PRS.
Table 2: Key provisions in the 2021 Bill and the Ordinance vis-a-vis the Supreme Court judgements
|
Provisions |
2021 Ordinance |
Supreme Court Judgement of July 2021 |
2021 Bill |
|
Term of office of Chairperson and members |
Four-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
The Court stated that a short tenure of members (such as three years) along with provisions of re-appointment increases the influence and control of the Executive over the judiciary. In a short tenure, by the time the members achieve the required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term gets over. This prevents enhancement of adjudicatory experience, thereby, impacting the efficacy of tribunals. The Court struck down the provision of four -year term and reiterated its past judgements, which recommended a five-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Minimum age requirement for appointment of Chairperson and members |
50 years |
The Court observed that the minimum age requirement of 50 years violates past Court judgements, where the Court has stated that advocates with at least 10 years of relevant experience must be eligible to be appointed as judicial members, as that is the qualification required for a High Court judge. Such a high age limit also prevents the recruitment of young talent. The provision was struck down. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Time limit for appointments |
Preferably within three months from the date of the recommendations of the search-cum-selection committee. |
The Court noted that not mandating the central government to make appointments within three months (from the date of recommendation of the search-cum-selection committee) leads to delay in the appointment of members. This impacts the functioning and efficacy of tribunals. The provision was struck down over non-compliance with past judgements, which mandated the appointments to be made within three months. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Number of recommendations for a post |
Two names for each post. |
The Court stated that the recommendations for appointment of members by the search-cum-selection committee should be final. The Executive must not be allowed to exercise any discretion in matter of appointments in a tribunal. The Court struck down the provision and reiterated its past judgement, which specified that the selection committee must suggest one name for each post. The Committee may recommend one name in wait list. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021; The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Madras Bar Association vs Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 000502 of 2021; PRS.
There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP. In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar. The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar. In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee. Current regulations in the sugar sector A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98. Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills. However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy. Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs. The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry. Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector. The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market. Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time. The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems. Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production. The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs. For more details on the committee’s recommendations on deregulating the sugar sector, see here.
